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Executive Summary
Climate change jeopardizes socioeconomic stability, and sets back efforts at development. The increasing frequency 
and severity of climate-change-driven disasters threaten lives and livelihoods, food security, water supply, property secu-
rity, and economic prosperity across the globe. Adaptation is vital to make society resilient to the impacts of climate 
change. 
Adaptation means increasing our ability to recover from specific disasters; reducing vulnerability and promoting resil-
ience (both physical and financial) to catastrophe. Insurance can be a key tool in both these aspects of adapting to 
climate change. First, it provides the flow of capital to support communities and infrastructure to recover from disas-
ters. Without adequate insurance, the burden of paying for losses falls largely on individual citizens, governments or aid 
organizations, with significant impact upon already straining government budgets, and economic and social hardship 
for those affected. Countries with high insurance cover recover faster from disasters, and increasingly, governments are 
recognizing the role and benefits of insurance in transferring risk from disasters. Yet there is a large and even widen-
ing ‘protection gap’ of underinsurance. Second, insurance contributes to the wider understanding of climate-change 
risks, and helps promote measures that individuals and communities can use to improve their protection from cli-
mate-change-driven disasters. For example, insurance expertise in risk evaluation helps to make the economic case for 
flood defences, or for changes to how and where buildings are constructed. 
Using insurance is a step away from crisis towards risk management, and it strengthens socio-economic resilience 
under a changing climate. However, it is only one of the available disaster-risk financing mechanisms. It thus needs to 
be considered within a broader fiscal framework that also includes international assistance, catastrophe debt draw-
downs, and other financial securities, disaster reserves and budgets. Furthermore, insurance and other disaster risk 
financing mechanisms are only part of the solution: they need to be integrated into other resilience and adaptation mea-
sures as part of a comprehensive climate adaptation strategy. In this report, we make recommendations to maximize 
the benefits of insurance for climate adaptation:
Recommendation 1: Invest in open-source models that provide a long-term view of climate risk and link to insurance 
solutions. 
Recommendation 2: Joined-up policy-making to put climate-risk models at the heart of national adaptation strategies. 
Recommendation 3: Develop consistent climate adaptation regulation and standards across countries.
Recommendation 4: Foster insurance innovations that can respond to a changing climate risk landscape. 
Recommendation 5: Strengthen dialogue between insurers and policy-makers around Build Back Better. 
Recommendation 6: Converge insurance, humanitarian and development agendas. 
Recommendation 7: Promote and invest in risk literacy throughout society.
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1. Introduction
Climate change is increasing the frequency and severity 
of extreme weather events, such as flood, hurricane and 
drought, and therefore jeopardizing sustainable devel-
opment. Climate-change-driven disasters accounted for 
about 91% of the 7,255 major disasters between 1998 and 
2017.1  These disasters pose risks not only pose immedi-
ate risk to life, but also damage food security, water supply, 
human security, and economic growth over the longer term 
across the globe.2  
Insurance, when put in place, provides financial resilience: 
it generates a flow of capital to support societies to recover 
from disasters. In the absence of adequate insurance, 
the burden of paying for losses falls largely on citizens, 
governments or aid organizations, with significant impact 
upon already straining government budgets, and economic 
and social hardship for those affected.3  When disasters 
strike, insurance can provide financial protection to reduce 
setbacks to technological, economic and societal develop-
ment: it is therefore a mechanism for securing a society’s 
developmental gains. However, insurance is only one of 
the available disaster-risk financing mechanisms. It needs 
to be considered within a broader fiscal framework that 
includes other financial securities, disaster reserves and 
budgets, catastrophe debt drawdowns, and international 
assistance.
For maximum effectiveness, insurance also needs to be 
incorporated into a long-term, comprehensive climate 
adaptation strategy. Climate adaptation requires both 
physical resilience – the minimising of vulnerability to haz-
ard, and the provision of systems for response and recov-
ery – and financial resilience to the risks which remain. 
Insurance can play a key role in both aspects of adaptation 
strategies. Insurance can help vulnerable countries to 
absorb residual financial risks that have not otherwise been 
mitigated; but through its expertise in risk assessment, it 
can also identify and incentivize effective physical resil-
ience measures. 
However, insurance itself needs to innovate and adapt, to 
better address the needs and challenges of climate adapta-
tion. Insurance, particularly for property assets, is a relative-
ly short-term product, renewing every 1-5 years, whereas 
climate adaptation necessitates long-term strategies 
integrating physical and financial protection. The evolu-
tion of insurance products, alongside their integration into 
wider risk-management frameworks, will best support the 
identification and reduction of climatic risks, and increase 
preparedness for, and resilience to climatic disasters.
Our aims in this report are 1) to describe and critically 
evaluate available insurance-based mechanisms, using 
examples that can be understood by a wide audience; and 
2) to explain the key opportunities and challenges in using 
insurance mechanisms within wide-ranging strategies to 
increase resilience to climate change.
The report has the following structure. 
Section 1 is this introduction to the report. 
Section 2 outlines the principles of insurance and the 
risk-transfer value chain through which it operates. 
Section 3 explains different types of insurance products 
and their various applications and beneficiaries. 
Section 4 outlines the key reasons for, key mechanisms, 
and potential challenges of government intervention in 
insurance provision. 
Section 5 briefly indicates how insurance fits within a wider 
fiscal framework to affect risk prevention, risk reduc-
tion, preparedness, and recovery at macro-, meso- and 
micro-levels. 
Section 6 introduces the opportunities of insurance mecha-
nisms for climate adaptation, while Section 7 discusses its 
key challenges. 
Section 8 makes key recommendations about how insur-
ance expertise can better address the growing threat of 
climate-change-driven disasters. 
The Glossary defines key terms used in this report.
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2. The insurance value chain
The purpose of insurance is to transfer a specified risk 
from one party, an insured, to another party in order to 
increase the insured party’s capability to withstand finan-
cial loss. The potential for financial loss arising from cata-
strophic events, such as a major flood or a tropical storm 
is transferred to insurers. These insurers are capitalized to 
absorb part or all of the financial impact of these catastro-
phes, with their capital ultimately financed by the premiums 
they are paid for issuing insurance policies. In this section 
we will explain the risk-transfer process and the principles 
of insurance that underpin this process.
2.1 Risk-transfer process
Climate change exacerbates catastrophic risks that are 
a potential source of loss for citizens and businesses. 
For example, with the threat of tropical storm, a flood, or 
a forest fire, a citizen might be concerned about the risk 
of damage to their house, while a manufacturer might be 
concerned not only about the damage to their industrial 
plant, but also about the subsequent business interruption. 
Climate change is making more and more citizens and 
businesses vulnerable to such risks, so that a global mac-
ro-roadmap (such as the Paris Agreement) is required for 
action on adapting to climate change. Individually, citizens 
and businesses can also protect themselves from some 
of this potential loss by becoming insureds, meaning they 
transfer some of that risk through the risk-transfer value 
chain (see Figure 1). 
The insurer accepts the risk from insureds, charging them 
a premium for this service. Insurers are then responsible 
for the potential future financial losses according to the 
terms and conditions of the insurance policy. If a loss 
occurs, insurers will pay claims arising from the insurance 
policy. For example, individual citizens can buy an insur-
ance policy to protect their house from flood. They can 
decide the level of cover, and how much risk to retain them-
selves. For instance, if a citizen buys house insurance they 
can decide for which risks they will be covered (e.g. flood, 
fire), to what level of their house value they will buy cover, 
and what ‘excess’ or threshold they will pay themselves for 
damage before their insurance starts to pay. These differ-
ent factors affect the price of their premium. More com-
plete cover for multiple risks; full replacement value of the 
house; lower (or no) excess will each cost more, because 
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more of the risk is transferred to the insurer. Based on 
such decisions, insured citizens pay an annual premium 
for their policy which is much lower than the actual cost of 
their house being rebuilt if a disaster strikes. Then if a flood 
damages their house, insurers will be liable for the covered 
loss and will issue payouts.  Insurers calculate premiums, 
so that over time, the accumulated premiums from many 
insureds cover the probable losses of the unfortunate few. 
Insurers are typically private sector companies operating 
for a profit, but may in some political contexts be public-
ly-owned or government legislated not-for-profit insurers 
developed to fill a particular social need, as we explain in 
section 4. 
Reinsurers - Insurers make profit from trading risk through 
insurance policies. These policies, collectively, form their 
insurance portfolio. However, insurers must also protect 
themselves from having to pay too many claims simulta-
neously after a catastrophic event, such as a series of hur-
ricanes in the Gulf of Mexico that could strip their capital 
reserves. They therefore transfer risk to reinsurers in order 
to protect their capital reserves and ensure they will remain 
solvent to pay claims after a disaster. Essentially reinsur-
ance is insurance for insurance companies. Each insurer 
creates a reinsurance program that transfers some of their 
risk to a panel of multiple reinsurers, each of whom covers 
a percentage of future potential losses. As in insurance 
risk transfer, reinsurers agree the conditions upon which to 
pay their share of that insurer’s claims, in return for which 
they receive a reinsurance premium. The capital which 
reinsurers need in order to pay claims comes from different 
actors: (1) private market reinsurers that accept insurance 
risk for a profit; (2) other capital market providers such as 
hedge funds, mutual funds, sovereign wealth funds, pen-
sion funds, and institutional investors, also accepting risk 
for a profit; and (3) public sector or government-legislated 
reinsurers operating as not-for-profits to address a specific 
protection gap (see Section 4).
Apart from citizens and businesses, governments also 
transfer risk. Governments’ balance sheets and their public-
ly-owned assets are also exposed to natural catastrophes. 
For example, a government might be concerned about 
the risk of tropical storm damage to infrastructure such 
as roads, electricity grids and hospitals. The government’s 
balance-sheet would be badly affected by having to use its 
own capital for reconstruction, if no insurance is in place. 
Governments typically have significant catastrophe risk 
exposure compared to individual citizens or businesses. 
Lower-income countries especially – but not excepting 
wealthy countries with large government balance sheets – 
may therefore choose to transfer risk directly to the rein-
surance industry (see Section 4.3): to both private market 
reinsurers and the wider capital markets. 
Catastrophe models are used across the value chain for 
risk assessment and analysis, in order to facilitate risk 
transfer. Models allow insurers and reinsurers, corpora-
tions, governments and other public agencies to evaluate 
and manage their exposure to catastrophic risk, including 
pricing any risk they will transfer. Catastrophe models con-
sist of three parts: 
1) Hazard is about the probabilities of occurrence and 
severity of any particular potential disaster, such as a 
tropical storm or flood, at a given location, within a spec-
ified time period. 
2) Exposure refers to the inventory of elements to be 
insured, such as property values by location; taking note 
of specific characteristics such as building materials, 
typical uses, age, and replacement cost. 
3) Vulnerability assesses the level of damage which would 
be expected at different levels of intensity of a hazard. 
For example, when a storm surge hits an area with weak 
building regulations and few flood mitigation measures, 
it is more vulnerable to loss compared to an area that 
has strong flood control infrastructure and strong build-
ing regulations. Vulnerability assessment may include 
secondary impacts such as business interruption.
Risk = Hazard × Exposure × Vulnerability 
A model can run tens of thousands of scenarios, based on 
these three components, to identify what might happen 
under various plausible catastrophic events. Models aim 
to calculate the possible losses for any particular portfolio 
of insureds’ properties in any specified location. Based on 
these calculations, it is possible for (re)insurance compa-
nies to make financial decisions about the appropriate 
premium prices they should charge to ensure an accept-
able level of return for the risk being transferred. These 
premiums provide the basis for both profit and for the 
capital reserves that (re)insurers would need to pay claims 
for the risks they have taken – their capital solvency, which 
they must demonstrate to regulators. Models may also be 
used by insureds, to evaluate the cover they obtain relative 
to the premium paid.
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Importantly, models are regularly recalibrated based on 
recent events. Modelling is therefore at the front line in the 
evaluation of climate-related risks, because any likelihood 
that severity may increase, or that occurrence may be more 
frequent, will lead to increased losses, and hence require 
higher premiums. In particular, society’s need to under-
stand climate change impacts can be at least partially 
met by using such models to ‘run’ different possible future 
climate scenarios. In this way society can explore risk, and 
estimate the financial (and human) value of adaptation. 
For (re)insurance companies this exploration of future 
scenarios will reveal both commercial opportunities, and 
challenges to the design and uptake of insurance products 
(see Section 6.1 and 7.1).
The expertise required to develop models is usually expen-
sive. Models may be proprietary, with licenses issued by 
developers to industry parties for a fee. Or they may be 
owned in-house by industry parties as part of their own 
intellectual capital. Recently, development organizations 
have supported the generation and sharing of open-source 
models for evaluating risk and making decisions on risk 
transfer.4 
Brokers are an important reservoir of expertise in risk. 
Their key role is as market intermediaries, facilitating risk 
transfer from insureds to insurers (or from insurers to 
reinsurers). They do not themselves provide the capital or 
hold the risk, but they are often involved in a wide range of 
industry activities, from analysis to pricing, from claims to 
capital provision. As a result, their knowledge base con-
nects diverse risks, models, insurance actors, government 
and inter-governmental bodies, and insurance products 
from around the world; and they promote transparency 
and competition within risk trading. All this expertise may 
improve joined-up thinking on climate change adaptation.
2.2 The three principles: Risk pooling, 
risk pricing and risk diversification 
The risk-transfer value chain works to accumulate premi-
ums across all insureds, so that the few affected insureds 
can receive a payout to support their recovery. Three princi-
ples ensure that, in the event of disaster, each party within 
the value chain has sufficient capital reserves to pay the 
leveraged claims upon them. 
Risk pooling means that many insureds are needed to help 
spread the insurers’ financial risks of payouts from expen-
sive claims more evenly. In particular, insurers hold a pool 
of risk, from across a large enough population, that their 
combined premiums can provide sufficient capital reserves 
for insurers to cover the risk of large payments to a few of 
them in any given year. Pooling is not simply about econo-
mies of scale, but is based on a long history of cross-subsi-
dization. Insurance can be provided to all in the pool, even 
though statistically, some insureds face higher risk. For 
example, people with houses next to a river face higher risk 
of flood. Nonetheless, with a large enough pool of insureds, 
the overall effect of the likelier or greater losses to these 
insureds is distributed across the pool.  
Risk pricing: Despite the cross-subsidization effects of 
risk pooling noted above, there has always been an effort 
to ensure that those at higher risk also pay more for their 
insurance. Growing improvements in modelling (see 
Section 2.1) have made it possible to identify more accu-
rately specific properties or insureds most likely to trigger a 
claims payment, and to charge higher premiums for them. 
This is known as risk-reflexive pricing and is now a key 
component of offering insurance policies.5  
Risk diversification is a technique used by (re)insurers to 
spread loss exposures. A (re)insurer needs a wide range 
of risks spread across a wide geographical area, diverse 
enough to minimize correlation between those risks. A 
diversified portfolio may include different types of potential 
hazards, such as flood, earthquake and fire; for different 
assets from homes, to crops, to commercial businesses; 
and all of these may be located in different regions with dif-
ferent exposure to any of these hazards. For example, a (re)
insurer may diversify across earthquake in California, and 
hurricane in Florida, and this may be further diversified with 
flood in Europe and wildfire in Australia to minimize the 
possibility of having to pay multiple claims simultaneously. 
(Re)insurers with highly-diversified portfolios can achieve 
better capital optimization than those that are highly 
concentrated on a specific risk in a specific location – that 
is, the same amount of capital in reserve is capable of 
underwriting more risk if the risk is diverse. Diversification 
enables (re)insurers to demonstrate better solvency to 
regulators without having to transfer more risk away, which 
would come at a cost to their profitability that would be 
passed on to consumers through higher premiums.6  
These three principles are critical to understand how insur-
ance products can further climate adaptation. Insurance 
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products are a powerful form of leveraged capital for 
responding to disaster. But they can only work within a 
robust business model, in which for insurance to be avail-
able and effective it needs to conform to sound insurance 
principles of risk pooling, risk-reflexive pricing, and risk 
diversification. 
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3. Insurance products 
Insurance is one financial instrument, comprising a range 
of products which operate in different ways. This section 
explains different types of insurance products and their 
usefulness in different contexts. 
The following four considerations affect the choice of 
insurance product(s):
1. The position of the risk across a spectrum from low-fre-
quency-but-high-severity events, such as a one-hun-
dred-year flood that can devastate a society, to events 
of high-frequency but low-severity, such as low-impact 
floods during rainy seasons.
2. Any strategies in place to cover different stages of 
post-disaster risk management, from early action, to 
disaster relief, to recovery support, and reconstruction. 
3. The speed of financial relief needed for each of these 
post-disaster stages, from immediate response to later 
reconstruction. 
4. The parts of society and the economy that the product 
is intended to support, ranging from particularly-vul-
nerable citizens, to individuals and small businesses, 
to the commercial sector, to government assets and 
infrastructure.7 
Individual products may support different aspects of these 
four considerations.8  
3.1 Micro-, meso- & macro- levels of 
insurance
Insurance products can operate at micro-, meso- and mac-
ro- levels, which we now briefly explain. 
Micro-insurance is the direct insurance of individual or 
small-business policyholders. Increasingly, however, 
micro-insurance has come to mean the development of 
micro-products to insure the most vulnerable individu-
als in low-income countries; a parallel with the concept 
of micro-finance. Micro-insurance has grown over the 
last decades in developing countries.9 An example is 
R4, a partnership between the World Food Programme 
and Oxfam, which aims to increase the resilience of the 
livelihoods of people most vulnerable to weather-related 
risks. This program provides subsidized micro-insurance 
products which are linked to the specific risks faced by 
these individuals, the poorest farmers, enabling them to 
access crop insurance R4 takes an innovative approach 
to risk management by integrating risk-transfer (through 
insurance) with risk reduction. Farmers and their families in 
some of the lowest income countries are mobilized to take 
risk reduction action such as the rehabilitation of low-lying 
lands for rain-fed rice cultivation, the construction of dikes 
and stone barriers, the construction of dams and the cre-
ation of vegetable gardens, in return for insurance cover.10 
Yet micro-insurance continues to have a relatively modest 
global reach relative to its potential11 indicating problems 
in both the development of suitably tailored products and 
distribution channels, and, particularly issues of affordabili-
ty for the most vulnerable.
Meso-insurance refers to those situations in which the 
insured is not an individual, but rather an aggregation 
of individuals under a collective body. For example, the 
insured might be an organization that supports a collective 
of farmers within an area. This meso-level organization 
buys an insurance product designed to cover the collective 
of individuals; the individuals themselves are indirect bene-
ficiaries of financial protection. They will receive payments 
from the meso-level organization, based on any claims paid 
to the organization through insurance. Such products are 
often taken out on behalf of vulnerable individuals who do 
not have adequate protection – or indeed, any protection 
– through direct personal insurance, as per the example of 
the Kenya livestock insurance program in Section 3.3.1.
In macro-insurance, the policyholder is typically a public 
entity, such as a government, which pays an insurance 
premium to provide payouts in the event of national disas-
ter, such as a flood or tropical storm. The payout on the 
government product can be used for multiple purposes on 
behalf of the population of that country. For example, the 
payments might be used to maintain government services, 
in order that they can continue to support disaster relief. 
They might also be linked to supporting the most vulnera-
ble individuals, for example through disaster contingency 
plans that channel specific measures for relief, such as 
provision of food, to those beneficiaries most likely to be 
affected by the disaster (see Example 1 in Section 3.3.2). 
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3.2 Indemnity products 
Most of our understanding of insurance products is based 
on the principles of indemnification for loss against an 
actual physical asset. Assets such as a house, factory, 
commercial building, or power plant may be owned by a 
private individual or company, while other assets such as 
roads, hospitals or educational facilities can be publicly 
owned. The key to indemnified insurance products is that 
the asset has a known value for reconstruction; it is made 
of particular types of materials, in a specific location. This 
means the asset in question can be allocated an insured 
value, against it which can be indemnified. The price of the 
insurance product will be based on the cost of repairing the 
property and the likelihood of partial or full loss. High-value 
assets in very exposed areas, such as expensive infrastruc-
ture or high-value commercial buildings in coastal areas 
prone to both wind and storm surge, will be charged a 
higher premium than assets of lower physical value, not in 
an area at high risk of an extreme weather event. The insur-
ance contract is based on indemnification of the specific 
assets, and hence, actual losses to those assets are the 
trigger for payment. 
Actual loss trigger: In order for payment to be released on 
these products, an independent loss adjustor is appointed 
to inspect the damage after the event. The loss adjustor 
will usually be an expert in the specific type of damage or 
loss and its valuation, working for an independent com-
pany that therefore has no conflicts of interest with either 
the insured or the insurance company. They assess the 
damage and the cost to repair or reconstruct, after which 
a claim is paid by the insurance company to the owner of 
the asset. This claim may potentially be for the total of the 
insured value in the case of a full loss, according to the 
terms of the insurance contract. The trigger for payment 
is thus tied to the actual loss experienced by the asset 
owner, in respect of the identified event for which they were 
insured. 
The key features of indemnification insurance products in 
terms of the four considerations above are: 
1) Indemnity products are common for low-severity, 
high-frequency events, such as household, small busi-
ness and commercial cover against a range of potential 
losses that may not affect society but are still critical 
to the financial stability of those policyholders. If risk 
is reinsured, indemnity products can also provide for 
low-frequency, high-severity, catastrophic events.
2) Indemnity products are particularly suited to the 
expensive reconstruction phase of post-disaster 
management. 
3) Due to the process of loss adjustment that accom-
panies claims, indemnity products are not suited to 
immediate disaster response. They are much more 
appropriate to the medium-and longer-term responses 
of rebuilding physical assets. 
4) Insurance policies will pay out against insured value, 
which may not include any additional premium pay-
ments to build to a higher standard after loss. Hence, 
payments for reconstruction will not necessarily lead 
to the rebuilding of more resilient assets. Nonetheless, 
where insurance is linked to government regulations 
about rebuilding and enhanced construction codes it 
may be possible to increase the future resilience of the 
assets in question (see Example 3, Section 6.2). Such 
linkage indicates some of the opportunities for insur-
ance in climate adaptation (see Section 6.4). However, 
rebuilding and construction codes arise from govern-
ment legislation, and are not typically something over 
which the insurance company has control or jurisdic-
tion (see Example 4, page 25 and Section 7.2). One of 
our recommendations is therefore a stronger dialogue 
between insurance companies and legislators (see 
Section 8) about how insurance can financially support 
improved standards for reconstruction, in order to better 
future proof assets for climate adaptation.
3.3 Parametric or index-based 
products
3.3.1 PRINCIPLES OF PARAMETRIC PRODUCTS 
Sometimes an insurance product is not tied to an actual 
loss. Parametric types of products may be used for situ-
ations in which the insured is not looking for payment for 
reconstruction of a specified asset, but rather for funds 
to respond to a catastrophic event. A parametric or index-
based insurance product is a product in which a payout is 
triggered by a specific set of parameters or indices of the 
type and severity of the disaster. The parameters are pre-
agreed, and form the basis of the insurance contract. The 
buyer of the product can use the payment as they please – 
from emergency relief to reconstruction – but the payment 
is not necessarily tied to identified damage or loss. These 
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products, which were initially developed as catastrophe 
bonds to supplement reinsurance capital for the insurance 
industry, have become particularly important for respond-
ing to catastrophic events in low-income countries where 
insurance penetration is low. Indeed, they have been at the 
forefront of much industry innovation in providing disaster 
response for these countries. Such products comprise the 
following components: 
Trigger: The insurance cover can be triggered when pre-de-
fined event parameters are met or exceeded, measured 
by an objective model-based index of catastrophic events. 
For example, the event can be a tropical cyclone, where the 
parameters are the wind speed at particular pre-determined 
locations: or a flood, as measured by a rainfall volume and 
frequency over defined periods in a particular geographic 
location. Weather-related events are very common para-
metric triggers. 
There are many other possible index triggers such as mar-
ket indices, crop yield, power outage and more. For exam-
ple, an area yield trigger is typical for agricultural products. 
For this trigger, an index is calculated based on the typical 
aggregate yield of a crop across an area, and its historic 
experience of yield losses during a specified peril, such as 
drought. On the basis of this index, the product will trigger 
according to the average loss experienced by the crop 
across the area, rather than being calculated on a farm-by-
farm basis. These products can work at the meso-level of 
insurance to provide aggregate cover. Examples include 
government-legislated or government-backed agricultural 
insurance pools supporting a collective of farmers within a 
certain area. 
Index triggers can also operate at the micro-level to sup-
port vulnerable individuals in low-income economies, by 
triggering particular types of payout that help to allay disas-
ter for these individuals. For example, in Kenya an index-
based livestock insurance product was developed, with a 
trigger for payout when pasture levels begin to decrease 
because of drought. The trigger is based on a satellite 
measures of the color of the ground as a proxy for dryness 
that will affect the amount of livestock feed available. The 
aim of the trigger is that the payout should be made while 
the pasture is decreasing, in order to provide livestock own-
ers with money to purchase feed for their animals.12 This 
scheme suffered from insufficient demand during its initial 
pilot phase,13 until the Kenyan government subsidized farm-
ers’ premiums to encourage participation in the scheme. 
Since then, the scheme has been sufficiently successful in 
providing payouts to 275 nomadic cattle farmers, that it is 
now being scaled up.14  
Payout: a pre-agreed payout is issued if the parametric 
or index trigger is reached or exceeded, regardless of the 
actual physical loss sustained. If the wind speed or rainfall 
volume occurs within the pre-specified location, or the 
area yield, or industry loss is reached, as determined by 
an objective third party and specified in the contract, this 
triggers the payment. 
While indemnified insurance payouts are calculated based 
on the losses incurred in relation to the insured value of 
a specified asset, there is no single way of calculating 
the payout on an index-linked product. Rather, the pay-
outs are calculated according to the specific contractual 
basis of the product, which can be tailored to the specific 
demands for protection, making it a more flexible product 
than indemnity products. For example, payment can be 
triggered by modelled losses (that is, the losses projected 
to occur for the particular severity of disaster experienced, 
as opposed to actual claims for losses), when they exceed 
specified thresholds. By contrast, as we note in Section 
3.3.2 below, payouts on disaster liquidity products may be 
calculated to meet the modelled, projected costs of early 
action for the recovery phase after disaster. In yet other 
examples, such as the Kenyan livestock product, payment 
may be calculated based on a lump sum to provide feed 
for a specified number of animals per farmer in an affected 
region. Such payments typically have progressive trig-
gers, enabling partial payments where lower levels of the 
presenting conditions are met. The payout could therefore 
be equal to or less, but not more than the agreed amount in 
the contract. Critically, the common feature of such prod-
ucts is that payments can be issued much sooner, when 
the pre-agreed, modelled parameters or indices are met, 
rather than by the actual loss assessed after the disaster. 
3.3.2 DISASTER LIQUIDITY PRODUCTS 
Parametric insurance has been a critical innovation in 
developing rapid payout to support relief in the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster. As explained above, triggers can 
enable a payout if, for example, a hurricane occurs at a 
specified wind speed in a set of agreed geographical loca-
tions, as declared by an independent third party. Because 
there is no need for the loss adjustment associated with 
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indemnity products, once the parameters are met, the 
country can receive an almost immediate payment. This 
rapid injection of capital can then be used for immediate 
disaster relief, such as providing food, clean water, or 
shelter. 
These products are therefore often termed disaster liquidity 
products. As disaster response is typically a government 
responsibility, these products usually operate at a mac-
ro-level. For many sovereigns in low-income economies 
that struggle to meet disaster response costs through their 
own balance-sheets, these products have transformed their 
ability for rapid humanitarian relief. While reconstruction 
may come from international aid or other international 
development budgets, for these countries, immediate 
disaster relief is a priority that can be a viable and afford-
able product for them to purchase, even though they may 
have had little history of insurance. 
The timeliness and flexibility of parametric insurance prod-
ucts have thus encouraged their innovative application to 
many hazards to which low-income countries are vulner-
able. For example, payments triggered by drought can be 
used to support food security and protect the assets of the 
most vulnerable, as evidenced by the African Risk Capacity 
(ARC) (see Example 1). 
These schemes are not without challenges. Such products 
are still under development, and can fall prey to errors and 
insufficient information in the parameters or indices that 
are being modelled. For example, in Malawi under a similar 
situation to Example 1, ARC’s payments were delayed 
because of modelled assumptions about the type of grain 
being used. These assumed greater resilience to drought 
than was actually experienced by Malawian farmers, who 
were using a different grain. Such different outcomes from 
the same scheme show the importance of continuously 
improving the models involved in developing products. 
It is also important to assist those taking out products  
to examine what exactly they wish to protect, such as  
food security in the event of a climate-related disaster,  
as opposed to necessarily a climate-based rainfall index 
per se.16 
3.3.3 SUMMARY: PROS AND CONS OF 
PARAMETRIC AND INDEX-BASED PRODUCTS
Parametric and index-triggered products have valuable 
roles in addressing the four considerations of our opening 
paragraph, but they also raise some potential concerns. 
These products can be valuable for the following reasons: 
• They can address catastrophic risk, since the triggers 
and payouts can be linked to low-frequency, high-severi-
ty events such as tropical storm, excess rainfall, drought 
and other non-climate related events like earthquakes. 
• They can be used to support the most vulnerable: either 
as micro-insurance, albeit such `` are largely in their 
infancy; or, primarily, as meso-insurance, where they 
are designed as an aggregate product that can provide 
collective support for vulnerable individuals. For such 
individuals the development and purchase of a specific 
individual product would be neither viable for the insurer, 
nor affordable for insureds. 
• They are timelier, issuing payouts quickly and deci-
sively to reduce the immediate human and economic 
impact of the disaster. Since such products are often 
tied to modelled triggers rather than actual losses, loss 
adjustors do not need to assess the value of damage to 
assets which can be a lengthy process, particularly in 
the aftermath of a major disaster. Rather, the payment 
can be made within a matter of days to weeks, which 
Mauritania is impacted by drought on a frequent 
basis. It was among the first countries to purchase 
an insurance policy from ARC for an estimated pre-
mium of $1,394,000 for a total cover of $9,000,000 
for the agricultural season from July through 
November 2014. The product worked. After a very 
poor rainy season, Mauritania received a payout of 
approximately $6,326,000 in January 2015. With 
this rapid payment which gave them liquidity in 
the face of impending disaster, Mauritania had the 
necessary resources to alleviate a humanitarian 
crisis, providing 50,000 households with 50 kilo-
grams of rice and 4 liters of oil each over 4 months 
(April – July 2015). The timeliness of the payout 
had a positive impact; it prevented migration, and 
protected livelihoods and assets, by avoiding the 
distressed sale of livestock.15
EXAMPLE 1
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enables immediate action in response to climate-related 
events.
• They have higher design and purpose flexibility than 
indemnity-based products, as they can be tailored to 
specific issues or scenarios from which an insured, 
such as a government or a farmers’ cooperative, desires 
protection. For example, payments can be linked to the 
provision of food security in the event of a climate-relat-
ed disaster, rather than the reconstruction of assets.
Due to the above four features, these products are a lead-
ing component of innovative risk-financing strategies for 
disasters as diverse as weather-related events, agricultural 
risks, and pandemics. However, these products also pres-
ent challenges:
• Basis risk may occur, in which there is a difference 
between the payout triggered and the gravity of the 
disaster experienced by the insured. This may be both 
negative basis risk, in which the event severity is greater 
than that reflected in the modelled triggers, or positive 
basis risk, in which a payment is triggered despite the 
events being less severe than anticipated for that trig-
ger.12 At least some of such risk will be counteracted as 
models improve, particularly where there is funding to 
absorb the lessons from losses and use these to update 
models and indices. However, because these products 
rely on models rather than actual loss, there will always 
be incomplete information, unknown unknowns, and no 
model can ever eliminate all error. 
• Insureds may lack the financial literacy to select a 
product that provides protection from the actual disas-
ter that they perceive as threatening (see section 7.4). 
For example, food security is a specific threat, which 
may come from multiple different sources, only some 
of which will be triggered by a particular climate-related 
product. As products become more refined, and tailored 
to specific requirements, we can learn from them how 
to better specify the particular threat. 
• From the perspective of climate adaptation, parametric 
insurance products may provide little incentive to reduce 
risk, because they are not tied to actual loss. In them-
selves, these products do not encourage, for example, 
changing the natural or built environment to make 
it more resilient to disaster (see Section 7.2 on risk 
mitigation). Nonetheless, as we noted in Section 3.2 on 
indemnity, neither is there an automatic link from recon-
struction-based payouts to improved resilience. The 
challenge with all insurance products is to improve their 
interaction with resilience measures in an integrated 
climate adaptation strategy. In this case, better under-
standing of insurance triggers should reveal opportuni-
ties to finance improved community resilience schemes, 
including change to the natural and built environment. 
Improved resilience will make it less likely that a product 
will be triggered, making future premiums more afford-
able, perhaps with less subsidy (see Section 7.1).
 Insurance for Climate Adaptation: Opportunities and Limitations      13
4. Government intervention in insurance provision 
While insurance is typically a private market mechanism, it 
operates within the legislative and regulatory framework of 
government. As underinsurance undermines the socioeco-
nomic stability of society,17 inadequate access to insurance, 
or failure in private market mechanisms can trigger gov-
ernment intervention in insurance provision. This section 
considers such interventions, which can range from gov-
ernments taking some risk upon their own balance sheet, 
to using developmental budget funds to subsidize some 
form of insurance provision for other countries, to introduc-
ing schemes such as publicly-funded or publicly-managed 
(re)insurance pools that enable wider participation in the 
private insurance market. 
These interventions increase access to insurance but can 
also distort the market, and potentially override the price 
signals that might incentivize adaptation. Hence, as climate 
change increases both the frequency and severity of disas-
ter and also those areas that are vulnerable to disaster, 
such interventions will be needed to be carefully designed 
to support insurance provision, whilst providing incentives 
for adaptation. We now briefly consider the reasons for 
different forms of government intervention in insurance 
provision, and their benefits and potential limitations. 
4.1 Addressing insurance supply 
failure 
Extreme disasters can result in sudden large-scale disrup-
tion, or even failure, of the supply of (re)insurance for a spe-
cific risk. Disruption of supply occurs because of unexpect-
ed large losses that jeopardize (re)insurers’ capital reserves 
and, in consequence, ability to pay claims. They therefore 
withdraw from providing cover to citizens and companies. 
Detrimental socio-economic effects follow: for instance, 
homeowners unable to get residential property insurance 
may then be unable to get a mortgage; businesses without 
insurance may struggle to get finance. 
In such cases, governments may intervene to maintain the 
insurance provision that is critical for the socioeconomic 
stability of citizens and businesses. Typically, governments 
intervene to develop either: 
• a public sector scheme, with the capital reserves neces-
sary to offer insurance products underpinned by a state 
guarantee, as in the case of the Australian Reinsurance 
Pool Corporation (ARPC); or 
• a private sector but state-legislated scheme, such as the 
California Earthquake Authority (CEA), in which insurers 
can offer policies for the particular risks, but these poli-
cies will be covered by the state-legislated body.5 
The schemes mentioned above, ARPC and CEA, aimed to 
ensure vital insurance provision temporarily to enable busi-
nesses to continue to trade, and homeowners to protect 
their properties. 
Governments will usually intervene to restore an existing 
insurance market where supply has been disrupted, in 
order to restore socioeconomic stability, but such deci-
sions are neither clear cut nor universal across countries 
and markets. They are instead based on a range of finan-
cial, market and political considerations. It is very rare for 
governments to provide this backstop where there has not 
been an insurance market to be disrupted, although there 
are some examples of governments intervening to create 
a new market for very severe risks of a non-climate nature, 
such as the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP) for 
earthquake.
However, if disruption in supply is long-term rather than 
temporary, this is usually a signal that a particular risk 
is becoming too volatile – meaning too likely to result in 
extremely high and unexpected losses – for the private 
market to cover above a specific threshold. These sig-
nals of increased volatility are to be expected, and heed-
ed, under climate change scenarios which predict more 
extreme flooding or stronger tropical storm within an area 
(see Section 6.1).18 Hence, while government intervention 
to ensure continuity of supply is valuable to policyholders, 
long-term disruption may indicate that particular risks need 
new approaches to ensure adaptation to climate change 
(see Section 6.2). 
The extreme response to insurance supply failure is to 
remove trade in that risk fully from the market. Government 
intervention may remove only some of the most extreme 
risk: a ‘top layer’ of risk that is too volatile for the insurance 
industry to provide at a price that is acceptable to consum-
ers. In this case, risk below a certain threshold remains 
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covered by the private sector in the usual way. For example, 
one scenario might be that the risk of flooding increases 
due to climate change. As certain areas and policyholders 
become higher-risk, the insurance industry may remove 
risk from its own portfolios by simply not offering flood 
policies in such areas. A government might then intervene 
to provide a backstop for flooding that exceeds certain 
levels of loss; or it might step in to provide flood insurance 
itself, as occurred with the origins of the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP) in the USA. 
Furthermore, while government intervention ensures 
insurance continuity, it is important that such schemes do 
not simply remove the most volatile risk from the market, 
enabling trading in ‘the ‘easier’ or more profitable levels of 
risk, as this can distract public and private attention from 
the critical need for adaptation. 
4.2 Mitigating unaffordable insurance
The combination of more frequent extreme weather events, 
high levels of urbanization in hazard-exposed areas, and 
increasingly sophisticated risk models able to pinpoint 
high-risk areas and even specific properties,19 has resulted 
in a growing number of insureds in mature insurance mar-
kets falling into the “high-risk” category. As insurers need to 
adhere to risk-reflexive pricing (see Section 2.2), insurance 
products may ‘price out’ potential policyholders at high 
risk. Climate change can exacerbate the protection gap, as 
more areas and policyholders are added to that high-risk 
group that is priced out of affordable insurance. This prob-
lem has important social implications. In the aftermath of 
disasters, social inequality is widened between those who 
were covered, and those who were not. Under-insured parts 
of society in high-risk areas may never be able to recover 
financially, unless recovery is met from the public purse. 
Risk pooling to address (high) risk-reflexive pricing effects. 
Governments may endeavor to solve this problem by estab-
lishing schemes that make insurance products affordable 
to those in high-risk areas. In order to reduce the variation 
in risk-reflexive pricing, governments can artificially stimu-
late the risk pooling principle of insurance (see Section 2.2). 
Specifically, they can legislate to spread the true cost of the 
highest-risk cover across the wider pool of insureds. This 
may involve a range of interventions such as mandatory 
insurance – as occurs with the Earthquake Commission 
(EQC) in New Zealand, where all citizens with an insurance 
policy must take out earthquake insurance with the EQC – 
or a cross-subsidization of premiums, with all policyholders 
subsidizing the ‘at-risk’ policyholders – as with Flood Re in 
the UK, where all homeowners with an insurance policy pay 
a small levy that is then used to reduce the costs of flood 
insurance to those at most risk. 
While mandatory insurance, or cross-subsidy maximize 
insurance provision across wider society, including the 
high-risk areas and properties, badly-designed government 
interventions can also disincentivize climate adaptation. 
Those at the highest risk of repeated loss are not incen-
tivized to reduce their risk, or change risky behaviors (for 
example, through structural changes to their property to 
mitigate the effects of risk), since insurance provision is 
secured. 
This is known as moral hazard, in which policyholders can 
engage in risky behavior knowing that other policyhold-
ers, or the government, will incur the cost. For example, 
after repeated events in flood prone areas, leading to the 
rebuilding of highly exposed properties on more than one 
occasion, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
in the USA has come under attack for precisely this issue, 
with the criticism that “it is subsidized floodplain develop-
ment”.20 When the actual risk of living on a floodplain is 
not reflected in the premium, then policyholders have little 
incentive to engage in risk mitigation strategies that would 
lower the cost of rebuilding. Thus, whilst such schemes 
may be considered to be ‘fair’ in the sense that they help 
those not served by private insurance markets to access 
insurance, by suppressing important pricing signals they 
can reduce the incentive for investments in adaptation, 
leading to higher overall economic costs of disasters in the 
medium term. 
Hence, the design of such government schemes and pol-
icy-making should consider moral hazard issues that can 
lead to unintended consequences. Government interven-
tions for insurance provision should also align with actions 
for disaster resilience and climate change adaptation, if 
they are to have a strong, lasting impact (see Section 6). 
Government interventions towards affordable insurance 
may also invoke the third principle of insurance, and 
increase risk diversification. For example, both Spain and 
France operate insurance mechanisms which, being com-
pulsory, generate a wider pool of insureds; but they also 
ensure diversification across multiple risks. In practice, they 
cover homeowner policies of all the risks across the whole 
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country. Compared to private insurers that are selective, 
this ensures they can smooth or subsidize risk-reflexive 
pricing in the highest exposed and so most expensive and 
potentially unaffordable areas. 
While the Spanish and French examples, and other similar 
government interventions provide comprehensive cover 
for their citizens, and enable governments to control the 
pricing of that cover, they can also weaken the private sec-
tor’s insurance provision. Insurance companies can end up 
relying on the government-led schemes to take the majority 
of risks. They then lose – or never develop – expertise in 
transferring that risk, and therefore lose appetite for such 
risks. This effect may be counteracted through risk sharing 
between the government scheme and the private sector. 
Private-sector insurers can be required to retain some of 
the risk, and purchase reinsurance for some of it from the 
government, while the government scheme also purchases 
some reinsurance in the private sector. This ensures that 
both the insurance and reinsurance markets hold some of 
the risk alongside the government, as has been designed 
into the Australian and UK terrorism insurance schemes, 
and the UK flood insurance scheme. 
All of the above macro-insurance schemes involve some 
form of either government subsidisation, or government 
intervention to enable cross-subsidization of risk across 
the population. While these subsidies may be necessary to 
protect the most vulnerable (as, for example, with the R4 
program noted in Section 3.1), it is important to ensure that 
the cost of subsidies is transparent and published publicly. 
In this way the true price of insurance (before subsidy) can 
be estimated, and the price signal can feed into informed 
public policy about adaptation investments. By contrast, 
opaque subsidization may lead to the problems of moral 
hazard, and diversion of attention from adaptation mea-
sures as described above. Subsidization is of course only 
one of the possible approaches to make insurance more 
affordable for the most vulnerable and marginalized. 
Another approach is to design insurance products, such as 
those of R4, that support their participation. For instance, 
as women and men often control different crops and 
livestock or even have different financial capabilities and 
vulnerability related to the same risks, making insurance 
products more gender-sensitive in their design has been 
shown in pilot studies to alleviate some of those issues.10
4.3 Protecting the financial viability of 
sovereigns or sub-sovereigns 
While the insurance schemes described above are 
designed to protect private citizens and businesses, gov-
ernments may also intervene to protect their own financial 
viability. Typically, governments own public sector assets, 
such as critical infrastructure, hospitals and schools. After 
disaster, they need to pay for losses and reconstruction of 
those assets, unless they have financial protection in place. 
In addition, some governments have state and federal 
emergency budgets for risk management and disaster 
response that they may also wish to protect to avoid fiscal 
shortfalls after disasters, and the consequent increases 
in debt levels. However, some do not have any financial 
protection, or any disaster management system or emer-
gency fund in place to enable recovery from disasters, 
and instead rely entirely on international development and 
humanitarian aid. Increasingly, those development and aid 
agencies are themselves purchasing insurance to protect 
their own budgets in years when the demands from disas-
ters are beyond the scope of the budget.
We now explain four schemes which protect the financial 
viability of sovereigns. 
Reconstruction product. First, governments may buy a 
reconstruction product for their publicly-owned assets, 
particularly for critical infrastructure such as energy grids, 
hospitals, schools, and water supply systems. FONDEN in 
Mexico is a state fund for protection against national disas-
ter. Part of the fund goes into buying cover in the global 
reinsurance market: the government pays the premiums in 
order to protect the disaster budget from particularly high 
demands, and to provide additional funds after a major 
disaster, to enable the budget to stretch further. When 
losses rise above a threshold specified in the reinsurance 
contract, the government can expect a payment to help 
with the costs of reconstruction. The cover FONDEN buys 
is based on modelling of the risk of loss to federally-owned 
infrastructure and assets, and the cost of reconstruction.21 
This is not only a product for lower- or middle-income 
countries; it can also appeal to some high-income coun-
tries. For example, FEMA in the USA has recently begun 
to buy a reinsurance product to cover some of the pay-
ments arising from their National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP). Similarly, the state of Victoria in Australia indemni-
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fies all state-owned assets through the Victorian Managed 
Insurance Authority (VMIA). The VMIA then buys a reinsur-
ance product in the global market, using risk transfer to fur-
ther protect state capital reserves for reconstruction. Such 
schemes, when they are effective, can remove some of the 
financial burden of recovery and reconstruction post-disas-
ter from government budgets to reinsurance markets.
Disaster liquidity product. Second, as noted in Section 3.3, 
sovereigns may buy a disaster liquidity product, in order 
to cover their immediate post-disaster capital require-
ments, rather than the cost of reconstruction. Sovereigns 
in developing countries that have high exposure to natural 
catastrophe often begin experimentation with insurance 
purchase through disaster liquidity products. The insured is 
the state, not private citizens or businesses; and the state 
can often use the payout for any post-disaster require-
ments, such as petrol for generators, payment of the civil 
service, or the relocation of citizens. These schemes can 
be highly effective in providing governments with timely 
post-disaster liquidity to respond quickly and decisively to 
reduce the human and economic cost of the disaster.22
Publicly-owned insurers. Third, some countries have set up 
publicly-owned insurance entities to implement catastro-
phe insurance schemes. For example, the governments of 
France, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland (German-
speaking cantons). Turkey, the state of California, and the 
Republic of China (Taiwan), have all set up institutions 
that offer property catastrophe insurance to homeown-
ers and businesses, and the governments of Canada, 
Cyprus, Greece, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
Philippines have all established government-owned insur-
ers to provide agricultural insurance.23,24 These schemes 
typically offer insurance subsidized by government. In 
some countries, these schemes are perceived to have 
struck a reasonable balance, encouraging individuals 
to take some responsibility through paying part of the 
cost of insurance themselves, and thereby restricting the 
contingent liability of the government. Although it is often 
successful, if these schemes are not run on an actuarially 
sound basis they may end up having to be bailed out by the 
government after a disaster. Hence, the sound fiscal design 
of the scheme, particularly with regard to pricing risk and 
ensuring solvency of the government scheme, is critical.
Publicly-owned multi-sovereign schemes. Fourth, some 
countries, being too small and highly exposed to weath-
er-related disasters to buy affordable products on their 
own, form multi-sovereign risk pools to purchase insur-
ance-based products together. For example, small island 
economies are often prone to major devastation from a 
single peril, such as tropical cyclone. These low-income 
countries are too small, too undiversified, and their budgets 
are too limited, to buy a product in the private market at an 
affordable premium. However, by collaborating, such coun-
tries can use risk pooling and risk diversification, two of the 
principles of insurance, to generate combined power to buy 
cost-effective insurance products.
Innovative multi-sovereign pools have been developed 
to support the insurability of such countries. Specifically, 
governments, inter-governmental organizations such as 
the World Bank, and donor organizations have supported 
vulnerable countries to develop risk pools that cover an 
entire region. These multi-sovereign pools can also reduce 
transaction costs to countries from contracting with 
international reinsurance markets, and can promote peer 
learning – whilst an individual country may only be hit by 
a large disaster every ten years, they may see insurance 
working for a neighboring country and so increase their 
own awareness of the financial and practical value of (re)
insurance. Examples include the Caribbean Catastrophe 
Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) which was a pioneer of this 
multi-sovereign approach, and which has made successful 
disaster liquidity payments on a range of perils over the 
10+ years since its inception, most notably paying more 
than $61m during the 2017 year of hurricanes that affected 
the Caribbean. Other such multi-sovereign mechanisms 
include Africa Risk Capacity, and the Pacific Catastrophe 
Risk Insurance Company (PCRIC). 
4.4 Failures in government 
intervention 
Proactive government interventions in private insurance 
markets can provide solutions to address insurance supply 
failures, subsidize the pricing of unaffordable insurance, 
and provide continuity of insurance to their citizens and 
society. However, reactive government intervention in 
disaster response is also prone to government failures that 
can exacerbate the gaps in protection, as we now explain.
4.4.1 COMMITMENT PROBLEMS
The aftermath of climate disaster is full of high-stakes 
political leadership and debate, media attention, public 
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appeals, and well-intentioned actions. Yet well-intentioned 
responses by governments and the international commu-
nity often fall short of their aims. The fundamental prob-
lem is commitment,25 whereby after a disaster, farmers 
and homeowners, subnational governments, and national 
governments are required to plead for help to benefactors 
and the international community, all of whom have retained 
discretion over how to allocate their budgets right up 
until those pleas for help. This ad hoc post-disaster fund-
ing model does not work well. It is too slow; it leads to a 
fragmented and underfunded response; and it encourages 
underinvestment in risk reduction and preparedness, there-
by increasing the socioeconomic costs of catastrophes. 
These shortcomings are further exacerbated as disasters 
become more frequent and severe due to climate change. 
The commitment issue can be identified as three separate 
problems:26
1. Disaster relief may be prone to a moral hazard problem, 
and the classic `Samaritan’s dilemma’ in particular.27 
Those at risk may deliberately under-protect themselves 
knowing that governments or donors will come to their 
rescue. This tendency is, of course, exacerbated where 
countries either lack the resources or the know-how 
to protect themselves adequately through insurance 
mechanisms (see Section 7.4 for recommendations on 
how to increase risk literacy).
2. Governments and the international community do not 
undertake the necessary steps before a disaster to 
avoid disaster-relief misallocation. Many people who 
should receive aid do not, and sometimes funds are 
diverted to those who suffered no losses at all. This 
problem stems from the fact that in the procedure of aid 
allocation it is difficult to monitor where exactly losses 
occurred, and to what extent. Accordingly, there is gen-
eral mistrust towards claims for payouts made by recip-
ients or the agency responsible for disaster relief. The 
mistrust in the probability of claims being valid results 
in the benefactor effectively giving less aid (see Section 
7.1 and Appendix A for examples of accountability for 
payment)
3. Finally, disaster relief frequently arrives too late. Besides 
practical reasons for aid not being timely, governments 
and the international community may wait to see what 
others give before giving. This strategic delay may 
reflect a desire for a clearer idea of the burden sharing 
among disaster relief funders, before making pay-
ments7 (see section 3.3 for examples of rapid-payment 
disaster liquidity products).
Insurance schemes are one way that governments can 
plan ex-ante for climate-driven disasters, and reduce their 
dependence on donors. Specifically, independent disaster 
insurance institutions can (and in many places do) allow 
governments to break the typical disaster relief com-
mitment problem. These institutions need to be able to 
commit to:25 
1. A coordinated plan for post-disaster action agreed in 
advance
2. A fast, evidence-based decision-making process
3. Financing on standby to ensure that the plan can be 
implemented.
These commitment devices can allow wider and deeper 
transparency of decision-making before and during crises, 
whilst also facilitating the participation of people in robust, 
inclusive planning processes.28
4.4.2 INEQUALITY IN PROTECTION 
Through allocating resources, governments make implicit 
policy choices over whom to help with protection against 
what. Whilst this may be seen as a legitimate policy choice, 
this can leave large gaps in coverage, and can end up 
exacerbating inequalities.29 For example, poorer herders 
in Mongolia tend to lose a higher proportion of their herds 
to the same adverse weather conditions compared with 
their wealthier neighbors, because they have less access 
to pasture, campsites, shelter, fodder, wells and veterinary 
services.30 However, they are also less likely to purchase 
insurance from Mongolia’s subsidized, but voluntary, index-
based livestock insurance program, where 80 percent of 
subsidies go to larger herders with more than 200 animals. 
So, in the event of a dzud, a harsh Mongolian winter, poorer 
herders are faced with both higher mortality and lower 
insurance coverage than wealthier herders.
Depending on its design, agricultural insurance can lead 
to those excluded from cover, such as landless laborers, 
going even further backwards after disaster.31 In the event 
of a severe drought, for example, insured farmers would 
have additional purchasing power for whatever food and 
services are available in the market during the drought. Any 
such price increase would reduce the ability of the landless 
to purchase such food or services. The same can be true 
of other forms of catastrophe insurance, such as prop-
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erty catastrophe schemes which only cover titled land or 
immovable assets, and therefore could leave slum dwellers 
even less able to afford building materials after a flood. 
The most vulnerable are in particular need of well-designed 
government interventions, because they are rarely in a posi-
tion to either evaluate or afford insurance schemes from 
their own resources. Hence, governments need to design 
schemes with protection of the most vulnerable in mind 
(see Appendix A).7
 Insurance for Climate Adaptation: Opportunities and Limitations      19
5. Insurance: A mechanism for adaptation within a wider 
 fiscal framework
In this section we position insurance within the wider fiscal 
framework, showing how governments can maximize 
the efficiency of insurance solutions by integrating them 
with other financial measures, and with a comprehensive 
climate adaptation plan. 
Insurance is not a single solution to issues of climate adap-
tation. Other financial instruments have roles to play, and 
governments should consider insurance as an important 
part of a suite of financial measures. An integrated financ-
ing strategy can ‘mix and match’ from the available finan-
cial instruments to generate more comprehensive cover 
across the spectrum of risk; more cost-effective cover; and 
more timely and practically effective cover.  
Mixing financial instruments can also give governments 
the budget flexibility to meet two different objectives: to 
provide a rapid and effective response to disaster; and to 
protect the public finances from the enormous costs of 
disaster. Finally, the right mixture can help countries to 
reach the widest range of socio-economic levels in their 
society.32  
It is therefore important to understand how insurance ‘fits’ 
with other financial instruments, within an overall strategy 
for climate adaptation. This is summarized at a macro-level 
in Figure 2.
The left-hand column of Figure 2 places insurance risk 
transfer in the context of climate adaptation. Risk identi-
fication and assessment is a core expertise of insurance, 
and the necessary first step in considering physical resil-
ience measures, such as risk reduction and preparedness. 
These measures reduce the residual risk which needs 
financial protection, and therefore reduce premiums and 
make insurance (or other financial instruments) more 
cost- effective. However, risk transfer can also support and 
incentivize action on physical resilience, such as the build-
ing of flood defences, or the development of early-warning 
systems for drought (see Section 6).
The key function of insurance is to provide financial pro-
tection against risk. The central column of Figure 2 shows 
climate risks on a spectrum of frequency and severity. For 
example, in some regions, localized wildfires occur practi-
cally every year, but the total losses may usually be relative-
ly small. In other regions, a catastrophic tsunami may only 
occur once in a hundred years, but (as in Japan in 2011) kill 
thousands, and destroy or seriously damage more than a 
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million buildings. In Figure 2 the probability increases down 
the column, the severity increases upwards. 
As we indicate in the right-hand column of Figure 2, a 
broad spectrum of financial instruments can help govern-
ments address these different risk levels.33 Such a layered 
approach to climate and disaster risks can help govern-
ments identify which financing strategy might provide best 
use of capital. For instance, in the case of frequent but 
low-severity wildfires, a government might maintain a con-
tingency fund year-on-year, thus retaining the risk. For the 
small probability of tsunami, various risk transfer products 
will probably be most cost-effective. 
However, choice of financial instrument is not simply a 
matter of how severe the event will be: it also depends 
on the protection needs that the government wants to 
address. It might use parametric or index-based products 
to provide rapid, timely funding for disaster relief after 
a climate event, and indemnity-based insurance to fund 
reconstruction (see Section 3). The government’s finan-
cial resilience is improved by using both. As illustrated in 
the Figure, insurance can be complemented by other risk 
financing instruments to address risks in lower layers. 
The use of risk transfer products also feeds back into 
climate adaptation strategy. A government purchasing a 
disaster liquidity product knows that money will quickly 
be available in case of disaster, and can accordingly plan 
and budget its response systems much more specifical-
ly. Countries may be drawn together into risk pools (see 
Section 2), such as African Risk Capacity (see Section 6) 
because risk pooling drives down the cost of insurance, 
and subsequently develop a joint expertise in early-warning 
systems. 
On a micro-level, insurance provides direct financial pro-
tection for lives and livelihoods affected by disaster. As 
explained in section 4.1, where private insurance markets  
fail to offer insurance cover affordable to large sectors 
of the population, government-led programs can act as 
insurers of last resort. These may seek to engage private 
insurers in various ways, include some provision of capital, 
or design of the products, or as distribution channels for 
payouts. They can also tie payouts to general policy on 
risk reduction, thereby reducing risk levels to a point where 
private insurance comes back to the market. Government 
can also develop policies and shape regulatory frameworks 
for sustainable meso-insurance products. For example, as 
in the Kenya livestock programme (see section 3.3.1) they 
may pay for the development of micro-insurance products 
for poor farmers with very specific circumstances and 
needs. In such cases the development expenditure may 
not generate enough commercial return to be viable for a 
private insurer, but the private insurer can be a partner once 
the micro-insurance product is established. The govern-
ment can also ensure that climate-risk preparedness and 
reduction behaviours are incentivized in line with its broad-
er climate adaptation strategy.
Insurance risk transfer and other risk financing solutions 
should therefore be embedded into macro-fiscal frame-
works and given budget allocations with guidelines for their 
implementation; all within national policies for both disas-
ter management and climate adaptation. Climate adapta-
tion strategies should promote the sharing of insurance 
expertise, and ensure that specific insurance solutions 
for financial protection also incentivize risk reduction and 
preparedness. 
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6. Insurance for climate change adaptation: The opportunities
Building resilience to disasters34,35 is key to climate-change 
adaptation. Insurance can be an important tool for adap-
tation as it is strongly linked, in several ways, to disaster 
resilience in society. First and foremost, insurance provides 
financial resilience, the capital to support response and 
recovery. Financial resilience minimizes the impacts of 
disasters and provides financial stability to insureds in their 
aftermath. However, if it leads purely to reconstruction of 
what was destroyed, without doing so in a manner more 
adapted to climate change, then the underlying vulnera-
bility remains unchanged. Here, we present an Insurance 
Resilience Framework, to show how insurance can support 
not only financial resilience, but also other activities essen-
tial to climate change adaptation, including risk reduction, 
resilient reconstruction and preparedness.
6.1 Identifying climatic risks 
The process of generating an insurance product involves 
the identification and analysis of risks, typically through 
rigorous modelling, (see catastrophe models in section 
2.2). This central function in the generation of insurance 
products is indicated in Figure 3 by the thick arrow between 
financial resilience and risk identification. At the same 
time, risk identification is one of the first steps in disaster 
resilience. The risk identification expertise of the insurance 
industry can also be of great value for local communities 
and governments, particularly when the insurance indus-
try engages with emerging markets, where such data or 
approaches to risk have previously not been considered. 
Insurance companies that share risk information and 
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expertise can help countries and local communities to 
better identify specific climate-change-driven risks against 
which they may be able to make adaptations. 
Countries and communities with limited resources and low 
income usually also have low insurance penetration, and do 
not have a sophisticated identification and register of risks. 
The development of risk information and modelling in such 
countries is often only stimulated by serious consideration 
of insurance either by governments, development agen-
cies, or insurance companies seeking a new market. For 
instance, after working with ARC, the government of Ghana 
was able to develop contingency plans for identified risks, 
even though they did not eventually buy an insurance poli-
cy. Thus, risk identification enabled by insurance can build 
critical mass for resilience planning and stimulate action 
for climate change adaptation beyond the narrow mecha-
nism for financial resilience through payouts. The search 
for a financial solution drives the coordination of existing 
data and models and the development of new ones, as 
shown in Example 2.
Risk-modelling expertise enables both risk pools and their 
government members to understand and quantify the 
natural hazards that pose the risk of disaster, the exposure 
to the natural hazard, and ultimately the level of vulnerabil-
ity of communities to a potential disaster. This modelling 
expertise, if effectively shared with other resilience-generat-
ing stakeholders such as governments, (inter)governmental 
organizations, and other bodies at the local community 
level, can then inform adaptation measures. It should influ-
ence decision-making and policy about areas of unsustain-
able development, improving resilient reconstruction, and 
enhancing preparedness for disaster, as we indicate below. 
6.2 Signaling unsustainable 
development
The sheer amount of available data on risk exposure of 
property, particularly in mature insurance markets,  com-
bined with improvements in risk modelling, has resulted in 
more granular, personalized pricing of property premiums. 
Properties that are most exposed and vulnerable to loss 
In 2004, Hurricane Ivan devastated the Caribbean island nation of Grenada, and caused heavy damage in other 
countries including Jamaica and the Cayman Islands. Recognizing that they were all highly exposed to similar 
hazards such as tropical cyclones and earthquakes, the twenty countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
approached the international community for help to manage financial elements of their disaster risk. With techni-
cal leadership from the World Bank, a multi-sovereign risk pool, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility 
(CCRIF), was proposed to transfer some of the risk of disaster into global reinsurance markets. Collectively, each of 
these relatively small countries would benefit from shared technical expertise and operational costs, diversification 
across their member states, and increased reinsurance purchasing power. 
However, proprietary insurance models for the region were sparse. First, the pool needed to develop data and 
modelling capabilities to help members quantify their risk. This would be expensive, as there were no consistent 
risk registers of public assets across the different nations. The data that did exist was of varied quality and accura-
cy, in terms of both robust hydro-meteorological observations for the projection of future hazard, and registers of 
exposed assets from which to calculate possible losses. A Japanese Government grant helped provide scientific 
expertise, drawing on existing understanding of hurricanes in the Caribbean, to quantify the exposure to hurricanes 
and ultimately the level of vulnerability of the member states’ assets to a potential hurricane disaster. These data, 
combined with a novel proposal to provide disaster liquidity products based on parametric triggers, provided the 
basis for ongoing risk identification. This information could then be used for a range of other risk-management 
purposes, such as strengthening resilience through flood mitigation initiatives, and disaster prevention improving 
disaster prevention awareness at the community level.37 The intention to develop an insurance product has provid-
ed the basis for a consistent form of risk identification in the region.
EXAMPLE 2
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The Texas Windstorm Insurance Association (TWIA) has influenced mitigation measures for houses and other 
low-rise buildings by requiring that they meet appropriate weatherproofing specifications. A Texas Department of 
Insurance (TDI) windstorm inspector visits buildings to ensure compliance with TWIA building specifications and, 
if the standards are met, a TDI Certificate is issued. While the Certificate is not mandatory in order to buy or sell 
a house, prospective buyers now have an expectation of TDI Certification when viewing any property. Mitigation 
against windstorms is thus incentivized via insurance in Texas. 
Adapted from McAneney, J., McAneney, D., Musulin, R., Walker, G., & Crompton, R. (2016). Government-sponsored natural disaster insurance 
pools: A view from down-under. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 15, 1-9.
In 2012 the Suncorp Group, one of the largest general insurers in Australia, withdrew from offering and renewing 
policies in the Queensland towns of Roma and Emerald. This withdrawal, that lasted for 16 months, came after 
Suncorp reported paying AU$150 million in claims in return for AU $4 million in premiums after these towns flood-
ed three times in two years.i The decision brought about a rapid response on the part of government, in the con-
struction of levees to reduce the risk of flooding. After these risk mitigation measures were implemented, insurers 
returned to offering policies, now priced affordably to reflect the reduced risk of flooding. While it is true that this 
example worked within an area where there was one dominant insurer, high local awareness of the threat, and a 
specific means of reducing the risk, it nonetheless shows how insurers can exert market pressure and work with 
governments to enable risk mitigation measures. 
Adapted from McAneney, J., McAneney, D., Musulin, R., Walker, G., & Crompton, R. (2016). Government-sponsored natural disaster insurance 
pools: A view from down-under. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 15, 1-9.
i  See http://insurancenews.com.au/local/suncorp-quits-flood-towns-and-calls-for-mitigation-action.
EXAMPLE 3
EXAMPLE 4
from particular hazards can be pinpointed and their poli-
cyholders charged premiums that more accurately reflect 
their specific risks. 
Insurance sends a strong price signal that specific risk-
prone areas are only viable to insure if charged with a high 
premium. If an area has an increasing number of properties 
that are highly priced to reflect their risk, it is likely, as we 
explained in section 4.2, that it will no longer be economi-
cally affordable for people to buy insurance. More broadly, 
the market signal of high prices can be seen as the prompt 
to improve risk mitigation in risk-prone areas. Insurers may 
be able to lower the premiums to these policyholders, if 
suitable risk reduction measures are taken. 
While insurers do not have control over the legislation nec-
essary to change planning permissions over where to build, 
or construction regulations on how to build, they can none-
theless use the price signal to influence risk reduction in 
different ways. First, insurers can, and often do, reward indi-
vidual risk-reduction behaviors by reducing policy premi-
ums. Second, such pricing signals can enable or motivate 
governments to implement changes in planning permission 
and policy over land-use planning and building codes for 
high-risk areas (see Example 3 below). Third, increased 
premiums or even unwillingness to insure properties in a 
region at high-risk can motivate or force a government to 
reduce risk in the natural or built environment for a whole 
region (see Example 4 below). Even for vulnerable com-
munities, where there are few building codes or land titles, 
insurance can still be linked to improved resilience at the 
policy level and also, as with the R4 initiative, can support 
community resilience measures at the micro- or meso-lev-
el. These activities can lead to strengthened physical 
resilience beyond the financial resilience achieved through 
insurance payouts: for example, through the improved 
resilience of critical infrastructure or the restoration of 
ecosystems as resilience-building barriers. In addition, the 
ongoing insurability and loss history of an area, after the 
implementation of resilience measures, can help to quan-
tity the benefits of such climate adaptation activities and 
encourage further such initiatives. 
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6.3 Preparedness 
Disaster preparedness, involving early warning systems 
and contingency planning, can be encouraged through the 
use of catastrophe models in insurance. An insurance com-
pany may have the data to indicate the likelihood of loss, 
allowing it to build understanding of how to prepare for a 
disaster, but may not have the power to enforce active pre-
paredness steps. The company can suggest and incentiv-
ize better ways for their policyholders to prepare for disas-
ters, for example, via preparedness guides and checklists, 
that can potentially help reduce the risks to them and their 
properties. For example, hurricane warning systems use 
communications via some or all of television, radio, social 
media, mobile text-alerts, and more, to warn residents to 
deploy storm shutters on their windows. Of course, such 
alerts are only of value where people have the financial and 
physical capacity to act in response, and where there are 
coordinated systems to facilitate those responses, such as 
evacuation plans in preparation for a disaster. Importantly, 
these preparation systems can specifically link insurance to 
contingency plans for addressing disaster, as our Example 
5 shows.
A key feature of the way ARC inducts its member states is to take them through a process of risk modelling. This is 
used as a basis for designing early warning systems for impending disaster from drought, and to undertake contin-
gency planning for how, specifically, they will use any payouts to address the disaster. All this work is done before 
the country might take out the risk-financing component of membership. The establishment of such risk prepared-
ness procedures in ARC is helped by the fact that most of the scheme deals with drought, a slow-onset disaster 
in which the impact can be observed, and targeted responses enacted as the disaster worsens. In addition, the 
payments are intended to support food security, for which, again, there can be contingency planning in advance. 
Preparedness for other types of risks, where onset is more rapid, may be different. Nonetheless, some early warn-
ing systems, and other preparedness measures, may be adopted as a spillover effect from the risk modelling and 
identification enabled by insurance.
EXAMPLE 5
Preparedness need not only be physical but can also 
include improved financial planning and preparation. Better 
understanding of hazards and associated vulnerability can 
enhance financial preparation for disasters by allowing gov-
ernments to better assess the economic costs of disasters, 
and how these impact different ministerial budgets. Such 
planning may in its turn support the design of new financial 
products to complement and extend the relief provided by 
insurance products. 
An example is forecast-based financing (FbF) – a mech-
anism for releasing humanitarian funding triggered by a 
pre-established forecast threshold. The goal of FbF is to 
anticipate disasters; to prevent their impact, if possible; and 
to reduce human suffering and losses. A key element of 
FbF is that the allocation of financial resources is agreed 
in advance, together with the specific forecast threshold 
that triggers the release of those resources for the imple-
mentation of early actions. The roles and responsibilities 
of everyone involved in implementing these actions are 
defined in a protocol that ensures the full commitment of 
implementation among the involved stakeholders. 
FbF has been piloted by the Red Cross Society in villag-
es facing a high risk of flooding in Peru, Togo, Uganda, 
Bangladesh, and Mongolia.39 It uses weather and climate 
science to anticipate possible impacts in risk-prone areas, 
and to mobilize resources automatically before an event.40 
For instance, building on Togo community-based early 
warning systems, Red Cross has developed a flood-risk 
forecasting tool called FUNES, to trigger early prepared-
ness action and to release funding necessary for rapid risk 
reduction before the flood hits. FUNES is a catastrophe 
model which uses a self-learning algorithm to predict 
flood risk in the populous Mono River basin. The model 
integrates three sets of data: flow data entered daily by 
dam operators; upstream rainfall readings, transmitted 
by observers using SMS; and actual flood impact data, 
entered each year by Togo Red Cross. The result is a model 
specific to the local communities at risk, which generates 
increasingly accurate forecasts of flood impact, allowing 
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identification of trigger points at which financing should be 
released - hence, forecast-based financing. 
However, such forecasting could also be supported by 
already-available insurance triggers. For example, satellite 
data can now be used to forecast drought based on green-
ing measures (see the Kenyan livestock insurance program, 
Section 3.3.1), in order to put in place humanitarian aid 
and preparedness strategies before catastrophe occurs.41 
While some promising entry points exist for linking flood 
forecasts with FbF, this technique is relatively new and not 
widely tested, and has not yet gained significant ground. 
Rapid mobilization of funds enabled by FbF can reduce 
disaster impacts, but in order to be effective it needs signif-
icant research and development on trigger thresholds, trig-
ger processes, and payout distribution processes. It also 
needs further scaling up and stronger links with disaster 
risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies. 
6.4 Building Back Better: Resilient 
Reconstruction 
Building Back Better is a philosophy which integrates risk 
reduction into reconstruction after disaster. It sees the 
disaster aftermath as an opportunity to improve resilience 
and revitalize livelihoods, economies, and the environ-
ment.42 For instance, buildings can be reconstructed to 
better withstand future climate risk; but they might also 
integrate climate-smart technology such as remote sens-
ing. Ideally, improvements in physical resilience would be 
planned for the potential climate changes over the build-
ing’s lifetime – probably a matter of decades. This requires 
a far-sighted approach to construction regulations in gener-
al, to ‘future-proof’ all new building against climate change.
Build Back Better as a philosophy therefore needs good 
forecasting of climate change, and thereafter, stringent 
government policy consideration to improve construc-
tion codes. Those codes must reduce risk and improve 
climate-change resilience, but they should also improve 
sustainability by lowering greenhouse gas emissions. 
Insurance expertise in risk assessment and evaluation 
should be included in that policy consideration, both for 
itself, and because risk reduction makes insurance more 
affordable and cost-effective.  If reconstruction is to be 
financed by insurance payouts, the payouts then need to 
reflect the necessary improved building standards. 
Climate-change forecasting is beginning to happen, but it 
is patchy and local, rather than global. Admirable initiatives 
have been taken in South Africa, which recently developed 
a ‘Greenbook’ projecting a range of climate change scenar-
ios to 2050,43 while the Australian Actuaries Climate Index18 
was launched in 2018 to help Australian policy-makers and 
businesses to incorporate increasing climate risk into their 
decision-making. However, neither yet gives a level of detail 
which can support such (re)construction policy, let alone 
suggest how insurance cover could be priced to allow the 
cost of resilient rebuilding.
The post-disaster setting is a complex and demanding 
environment, and not a good place or time to start a fresh 
conversation about rebuilding standards.44 Insurance is 
best integrated into a Build Back Better approach through 
pre-arranged, ex-ante recovery and reconstruction plans 
that account for climate-risk management. Involved 
insurers could further incentivize Building Back Better, by 
applying pre-determined premium reductions when the 
insurance policy is resumed after resilient reconstruction.45 
For example, reinsurers have been working with FORTIFIED 
(a program by the US Institute for Business and Home 
Safety) in the USA to promote reconstruction to a superior 
(voluntary) set of building standards after insured homes 
have been affected by natural disasters.46 At the house-
hold-level, insurers can work with FORTIFIED-linked civil 
engineers, construction companies, and public initiatives to 
offer services and products that support resilience.
Insurers should be invited onto working parties containing 
all the government departments concerned with develop-
ment planning, so that insurance can inform decision-mak-
ing around risk-reduction and resilient reconstruction.
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7. Insurance for climate change adaptation: The challenges
For insurance mechanisms to maximize their support for 
climate change adaptation, it is necessary to take a realis-
tic look at the significant barriers that prevent their effective 
use. Barriers often stem from complex negotiations across 
different types of public and private stakeholders, a rela-
tively low understanding of insurance mechanisms, and 
the need for insurance to be integrated both into a compre-
hensive suite of connected adaptation practices, and into 
the broader development agenda. In addition, insurance is 
a very specific type of financial solution, that itself needs 
some innovation and adaptation in order to address the 
implications of climate change. These innovations will need 
to be implemented within strict financial controls to ensure 
the relevance of products to cover climate-related risk, and 
the solvency of insurers to pay for them. In this section, we 
will discuss the limitations of, or barriers to using insurance 
in climate adaptation. 
7.1 Increasing insurance penetration: 
Bridging the protection gap
As we noted in our introduction, despite increasing insur-
ance innovation, the protection gap remains significant. 
While insurance can be an important mechanism for 
climate adaptation, it needs to be adequately spread 
to relevant sections of society in order to have positive 
effects. Density of insurance penetration is critical to a 
society’s ability to recover post disaster.17 Those countries 
with higher insurance penetration recover faster after a 
disaster, as quick payouts lead to faster reconstruction. In 
combination with a technology upgrade, such rebuilding 
might even stimulate economic development and boost 
GDP. By contrast, insurance penetration in low-income 
countries usually falls below 1%. For example, Madagascar, 
one of the poorest countries in the world, has an insurance 
penetration of 0.2%. Economic shocks and extreme events 
constitute a huge burden and make the country highly 
vulnerable. The poorest people are particularly vulnerable 
as they have few financial coping strategies; they depend 
on humanitarian aid. 
The reasons for low insurance penetration, even in rela-
tively wealthy countries, are complex. One reason lies in 
human beings’ cognitive biases around low probability-high 
loss events,  meaning that potential insureds – not only 
individuals, but also government actors – ignore the very 
real threat of disaster on the basis that it is so unlikely, that 
it will not affect them. This cognitive bias is often com-
pounded by cultural barriers to insurance, for instance in 
countries where disaster has either been seen as a matter 
of ‘fate’48  or as something for which compensation is the 
government’s responsibility. In such contexts, especially 
where there are few success stories about how insurance 
has transformed people’s lives, it is difficult to generate 
understanding of insurance or increase its penetration. 
Insurance as a form of ex-ante preparation for disaster 
puts an onus on those who will experience it, to take some 
responsibility and seek protection from that disaster. It 
requires forward planning around the probability of disas-
ter; and considerations about how those under threat 
might afford the losses they will experience, and about the 
mechanisms, including insurance, that they and their gov-
ernment might use for protection. As we note in section 7.4 
below, at least some of this responsibility can be encour-
aged by increasing financial and risk literacy across society.
The protection gap can also be associated with lack of 
availability or affordability of insurance products. Reasons 
for this lack range from insufficient reinsurance capacity 
for insurance companies to remain solvent in high-risk 
areas,49 to insurance companies increasing premiums to 
reflect high risk of disaster.50 As noted above, improved 
modelling has led to higher premiums for those at most 
risk of disaster and these assets defined as high-risk are 
actually growing, in part due to socioeconomic growth in 
high-risk areas, in part due to increasing frequency and 
severity of disaster arising from climate change.51  
Other studies suggest that a lack of information and 
expertise about how to model under-insured areas or types 
of risk contributes to the protection gap.52 In particular, 
designing suitable products for the risks from which vul-
nerable people need or want protection can be challenging, 
necessitating innovations such as the index-based prod-
ucts we discussed in Section 3.2, as well as considerations 
about who will pay for these products. Another fundamen-
tal problem, as we noted in Section 4, is that much risk 
remains uninsured because it has poor economic viability 
within a traditional market value chain.5,53  
As a recent report shows, many of these protection gap 
challenges can be addressed through the establishment of 
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a well-designed Protection Gap Entity (PGE), such as a sov-
ereign risk pool.5 PGEs can support risk sharing between 
the public and private sector in order to bridge the protec-
tion gap, meanwhile evolving their remit in response to the 
changing risk profile associated with climate change.54  
Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (CCR) in France and 
Consorcio de Compensacion de Seguros (CCS) in Spain 
are examples of publicly-owned (re)insurance institutions 
that support high levels of insurance penetration across the 
population. 
In addition, where insurance is a suitable product to 
protect the most vulnerable from disaster, but is beyond 
their means to purchase, such PGEs can be the vehicle by 
which insurance can be subsidized. Many individuals lack 
the disposable income to purchase an insurance product, 
and many low-income countries have such constrained 
budgets that insurance is beyond their resources. Here 
the question of subsidized premiums needs to be con-
sidered as a development tool. Insurance is linked to risk 
ownership, and so subsidized insurance, in which the risk 
owner does not pay the premiums for its protection, comes 
with concerns over moral hazard. Similarly, donors and 
development organizations may be reluctant to subsidize 
premiums on the basis that such money should be used 
within a country, rather than paid to insurance markets. 
However, many PGEs are publicly-owned and/or operate 
on a not-for-profit basis with the aim of using insurance as 
a means of enhancing social inclusion. In such situations, 
where a donor pays for the premiums, a well-designed PGE 
can be accountable for the ownership of the risk and the 
use of subsequent payouts to support disaster relief, and, if 
provided in the product, recovery and reconstruction.
It is a complex task to design PGEs that enable knowledge-
able ownership of risk, and accountability for distributing 
payouts. In Appendix A, we outline the extended formal pro-
cess that member countries of the African Risk Capacity 
(ARC) have to go through in order that payouts can be 
linked to targeted response activities. While donors or 
policy-makers may call for such strong links, it is important 
to understand what is required to get this done in terms of 
process, operation and governance. In order to ensure that 
indeed payouts do get to the most vulnerable households, 
it is necessary to structure effective public policies for 
responding to disasters in advance. This includes identify-
ing both levers to support, and barriers that might constrain 
the administration and flow of funds through government 
systems: from a central Treasury to implementing agencies 
and thence to beneficiaries. Development of such policies 
is extensive, administratively heavy, and, if ex-ante contin-
gency planning of this nature is a requirement to become a 
member of a risk pool, may actually delay pool growth and 
eventually risk its survival. 
On the positive side, the process of developing such public 
policies for targeting insurance payments to the most vul-
nerable after a loss can be an effective learning experience, 
enabling tracking of existing public financial systems, and 
their linkage to disaster response systems. 
7.2 Enhanced risk reduction 
Insurance, while it enhances the financial resilience of soci-
ety to disaster, is not a silver bullet. Increased insurance 
penetration is not enough to address climate adaptation 
unless it is connected to enhanced risk reduction. In partic-
ular, in areas where disasters are both frequent and severe, 
such as those with annually repeated flooding or drought, 
risk-reduction measures are necessary before insurance 
can be an affordable solution. As we noted in Section 6.2, 
insurance can be a price signaling mechanism indicating, 
through higher premiums, that an area or assets have 
insufficient risk mitigation measures. However, risk reduc-
tion rarely falls within the scope of an insurance mecha-
nism, except as a pre-condition to the provision of a policy.
Government departments and insurers must work across 
siloes to ensure that risk transfer promotes and even incen-
tivizes risk reduction, and enables change in the physical 
aspects of resilience. As we showed in the example of 
TWIA in the USA (Section M.N.O), insurers and policy-mak-
ers working in close consultation can change building 
regulations in order to make properties more resilient – and 
thereby, more insurable. 
Insurance can strengthen planning and minimize future 
costs of climate risks. However, if insurance is used as 
a blunt financial instrument to increase capital flow after 
disaster, it can actually be detrimental to resilience mea-
sures. For example, government schemes that suppress 
pricing signals, or parametric insurance that is not linked to 
paying for actual loss, can limit incentives to mitigate risk. 
Likewise, risk finance and insurance decisions on mac-
ro-fiscal levels are usually taken by the ministry of finance 
without engaging, for instance, environmental, transport or 
infrastructure ministries, that could ensure better alignment 
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with risk-reduction measures. If we are to take the associ-
ation between climate adaptation and insurance seriously, 
we also need to see how changes in the natural and built 
environment will reduce exposure to risk – and we need to 
think deeper about the sustainability of building in locations 
signaled to be at increasing risk of disaster. 
This issue of reducing risk is of vital importance to enable 
a significant proportion of a population to benefit from the 
security provided by affordable insurance. Yet the socio-po-
litical context in which insurance is joined to risk mitigation 
and risk reduction is often fraught. There may be complex 
negotiations between multiple stakeholders with different 
interests in, and understanding of, risk cover, and with 
different levers of control over risk mitigation decisions. We 
suggest that, where governments and development orga-
nizations support the establishment of insurance-based 
mechanisms to increase financial resilience, they also tie 
such development to improving the physical resilience of 
a country, including apportioning budget towards efforts 
at risk reduction. For example, Clarke and Dercon (2019) 
propose a ‘development bancassurance’ model, where 
development banks and development insurers work togeth-
er on an integrated package for countries.28 Development 
banks would finance the pre-crisis expenditures such as on 
prevention, preparation, and risk information, and develop-
ment insurers would finance the crisis-contingent expen-
ditures. These efforts to join the financing of risk reduction 
to insurance would have benefits at micro-, meso- and 
macro- levels in making insurance products more sustain-
able. In doing so, insurance can be part of the wider fiscal 
framework and physical planning necessary to support 
the virtuous circle of both bridging financially, and reducing 
physically the protection gap. 
7.3 Balancing short-term insurance 
products with long-term adaptation 
measures
While climate adaptation involves forward-looking mea-
sures to improve the resilience and sustainability, insurance 
as a product is designed around short-term protection 
of assets. Most of the products we have discussed in 
this report operate on the basis of a 1- to 3-year renewal. 
When the policy comes up for renewal, the premium may 
decrease if, in the interim, the assets have been better 
proofed against climate-related shocks. Essentially, insur-
ance is a reactive product to the adaptations that have 
already taken place, rather than a proactive product to sup-
port that adaptation. At this stage, the annual life-cycle of 
insurance products for physical assets is not directly linked 
to, and supporting, longer-term climate adaptation. 
There is evidence for the increasing use of multi-year con-
tracts for physical assets, particularly catastrophe bonds, 
which typically have a 3- to 5-year duration. However, multi-
year contracts of sufficient duration to cover a climate 
adaptation window, of, say, 10 years, would be challeng-
ing to implement under a regulatory framework that also 
demands solvency from insurers. Specifically, to ensure 
they could pay claims against a long-term and uncertain 
risk future, insurers would need larger capital reserves. 
These would need to be built into pricing that would make 
the cost of premiums prohibitive. Maynard & Ranger (2012) 
model various long-term insurance products against adap-
tation scenarios to show that, even for risks that remain 
stationary over the period, the capital requirements for 
insurers could be some 50% higher for a 10-year contract 
than an annual contract. This would increase further in the 
context of uncertain and changing risk profiles such as 
those associated with climate adaptation.55 Such capital 
costs would be passed on in premiums, making the prod-
uct less affordable to potential policyholders.
Insurance innovation is thus needed. However, this must 
be done thoughtfully, and with attention to the reputability 
of insurance as a promise of payment. It is important not 
to over-claim, or over-extend the capacity of insurance as 
it currently stands to provide for climate change. Insurance 
needs to price risk in ways that reflect the true costs of 
paying claims, in order to ensure solvency, and risk transfer 
should be used within a strong regulatory framework for 
ensuring such solvency. Furthermore, while reinsurance 
is one means by which insurance companies ensure 
solvency, reinsurance capital worldwide has limitations in 
withstanding large climate shocks within a specific region. 
Reinsurance capital will need supplementation from other 
risk-financing products, as well as tight integration with the 
wider risk-reduction measures noted in Section 6.2. 
7.4 Financial and risk literacy 
While there is increasing evidence that insurance supports 
productivity, growth and social inclusion56 significant chal-
lenges impede the ability of the industry to deliver on its full 
potential. 
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One particular challenge arises in emerging markets, 
where insurance is often viewed as a luxury rather than an 
essential aspect of development. This is just one example 
of a general lack of the technical risk understanding and 
insurance literacy which should inform a more resilient 
development agenda. Ultimately, a better understanding of 
risk and insurance will drive the development of fit-for-pur-
pose innovations that are needed to tackle the issues that 
many across the globe contend with, be it at the macro-, 
meso- or micro-level. For example, risk assessment and 
analysis could quantify the decrease in future risk that aris-
es from better enforcement of building codes, and hence 
demonstrate the benefit of spending additional funds on 
building code enforcement (see TWIA example, Section 
6.2). The unfortunate reality however, is that right now, deci-
sion makers are not fully accessing the range of insurance 
solutions, products, and approaches available to them, 
and which are an essential consideration for adaptation to 
climate change.
The development of risk and insurance literacy is important 
for many reasons, which include: 
• Improving the capacity to identify risk: Identifying risk 
is a fundamental first step in seeking to manage it. Risk 
assessments are central to the functioning of insurance 
markets both in their ability to underwrite and provide 
financing solutions and in driving better risk-manage-
ment actions and decisions. Modelling techniques and 
approaches developed by the industry over the years 
have played a critical role in building resilience (see 
CCRIF example, Section 6.1).  
 
However, in many countries, an absence of a coordinat-
ed and central approach to understanding risk remains 
a significant challenge. Risk assessment programs 
and activities are outsourced in many countries, as 
part of ongoing projects, rather than being built in or 
mainstreamed into government processes, so missing 
opportunities to enhance such capabilities within gov-
ernment departments.  
 
Climate change deepens the problem of this lack of 
built-in government expertise.  Risk will evolve both in 
timescale and geography, and further urbanization and 
development is likely to increase exposure. The ability to 
track and assess these evolving risks, across all social 
groups and economic activities, is vital to drive a new 
wave of climate-sensitive public policies and invest-
ments which will help society to avoid, mitigate, and 
adapt to such risks. 
• Shared analysis and dialogue around risk is essential 
for developing inclusive responses: Risk and its man-
agement are inherently political, with vested interests, 
institutional competition and administrative bureau-
cracies which are often in competition and sometimes 
cross-border and which can impede coordination and 
cooperation efforts.5  
 
Establishing mechanisms that allow for a shared and 
inclusive dialogue around risk will be essential for effec-
tive adaptation. Insurance enabling tools, such as risk 
models, often prove to be an entry point for objective 
discussions around risk and initiating the identification 
of possible solutions and requisite responsibilities for 
managing the risk. 
• Awareness of the pros and cons of the different tools 
available to manage risk: Risk management needs to 
be based on active considerations around tradeoffs and 
opportunities for efficiencies. Resources are not unlimit-
ed. Many in the public sector recognise that, to prioritize 
their efforts, they need greater awareness of the pros 
and cons of the different options available for managing 
climate risks, and importantly, the tradeoffs that each of 
them might need.
• Allocate responsibility and ownership of risks with-
in the broad policy framework: Once a risk has been 
identified and different tool available for managing risk 
have been accessed, the next critical phase is iden-
tifying responsibilities for managing the risk. Clearly-
ascribed ownership of a risk increases the possibility of 
that particular risk being better-managed. Without this, 
investments made will be ad hoc and fragmented. Such 
ownership is also essential for sustainability and driving 
the development of policies and financing need to man-
age the risk. With climate change, this need is amplified 
with scarce resources increasingly coming under pres-
sure and a need for more efficient expenditure. 
Risk literacy and an associated understanding of insurance 
and the suite of tools offered, presents an opportunity to 
support these deepened considerations around how gov-
ernments may drive their climate adaptation efforts in the 
short, medium and longer term. Such deepening of knowl-
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edge about insurance and its value is particularly critical in 
developing economies. In developed economies, insurance 
is already an established pillar for development. It is built 
into the system of financial protection without people or 
governments questioning its relevance. In this context, the 
industry has not necessarily been required to communicate 
its value proposition. By contrast, in emerging economies 
insurance is not financially and culturally embedded into 
the socioeconomic system of recovery, yet their con-
strained budgets make the need for such communication 
particularly important.
Despite this, building risk capacity and insurance literacy is 
not an easy task. It often takes significant time, involves a 
multiplicity of actors at various levels, and difficult deci-
sions around investments, all of which can be at odds with 
political timelines. Building a culture of risk management 
and insurance also means investment in generating capa-
bility and awareness. The two go hand-in-hand. 
7.5 Insurance as a local solution to a 
global problem
Climate change is a global problem, yet it manifests itself 
locally, in many different ways. Commercial, private insur-
ance companies have to invest in a thorough understand-
ing of the local risks and potental clients, then price cover 
according to the risk of claims for those very specific local 
circumstances. But for many people in the poorest parts 
of the world, those premiums would be unaffordable, so 
insurance companies simply ignore those local ‘markets’ 
as uncommercial. 
However, development funding can take a more global 
view to introduce insurance to such areas, thus accessing 
global (re)insurance capital for the financial protection of 
the poorest and most marginalized. Development funding 
might pay for the analysis and modelling of the local risks. 
It can also work to link the resulting insurance to risk reduc-
tion, thus making the area more sustainable, and poten-
tially reducing the cost of premiums. For example, the R4 
Rural Initiative by the World Food Programme and Oxfam 
offers micro-insurance specifically linked to risk reduction 
for smallholder farmers in Africa. R4 was initiated in 2011, 
with the specific aim of making vulnerable rural households 
more resilient to climate shock. The solutions are locally 
tailored to the types of crops and assets in local commu-
nities in Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal and Zambia, 
enabling the growth of such assets through risk reduction. 
The physical risk reduction measures are bolstered by 
micro-insurance for those assets, which also thus under-
pins micro-credit and savings plans.
However, not all localized effects of climate change are 
insurable. As noted in section 7.1, global (re)insurance 
companies must remain solvent for insurance payouts to 
be reliable. There may simply not be enough (re)insurance 
capital to provide in full for the global effects of climate 
change, even if the world could afford the premiums. 
Rather, as noted in Section 6.2, insurance can send price 
signals about the increasing unsustainability of some areas 
under climate change. Hence, insurance is always an inter-
play between local adaptation to climate change, and the 
wider policy dialogues and development agendas which 
can make local responses more effective.
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8.  Conclusion 
Even in a world that limits global warming to the ambitious 
1.5-degree C target set under the Paris Agreement, climate 
change will severely impact our lives and livelihoods, as 
well as the natural environment, and irreversibly alter the 
risk landscape across the globe. A transformative, long-
term approach to adaptation will be necessary to secure 
sustainable development paths, and cope with more 
frequent extreme weather and natural catastrophes. Using 
insurance to absorb financial losses related to climate risks 
is a step away from crisis towards risk management, which 
strengthens socio-economic resilience under a changing 
climate. 
Thus, we recommend a sequence of actions to benefit 
from insurance, and better surmount the challenges of 
climate impact in supporting climate adaptation.
Invest in open-source models that a) provide a long-term 
view of climate risk; and b) link to insurance solutions. 
Improved risk data and analysis of the impact of climate 
change are essential to increase understanding about 
the risk profiles of different countries, regions, assets and 
populations. These risk data should enable modelling of 
the frequency and severity of different climate events, 
geographic exposure, vulnerability, and potential financial 
losses. The data should then be modelled according to 
differing projections of the rate of climate adaptation: 
in other words, by different estimates of how much the 
vulnerability of the natural and built environment may have 
been reduced, over various periods of time. This will ensure 
that climate risk data, covering both a near-term and long-
term view of climate adaptation, can be linked to insur-
ance and the risk-transfer process.57 Such models should 
not be proprietary, but rather should be open and widely 
available. This will ensure that they can be used to support 
public and private insurance mechanisms, including the 
piloting of insurance innovations, without the pressure to 
recoup costs from commercial transactions. Hence, we 
need investment in analytics and in academic research 
institutions in order to service the collaborative design of 
climate risk models. Such risk modelling needs to crowd in 
the best science, drive innovation, and raise the standard 
of understanding of climate risk at all levels of society. It 
should thereby leave a legacy of open data and informa-
tion that supports broader climate-risk management for 
governments, firms and people. This will enable innovative 
and cost-effective insurance solutions for today and in light 
of future climate adaptation.
Joined-up policy-making: Put climate-risk models at 
the heart of national adaptation strategies. Risk data 
and modelling helps to inform policy-makers on hazards, 
exposures and vulnerabilities within their country. They 
should inform prevention, risk reduction, preparedness, and 
consideration of risk transfer. A national climate adaptation 
strategy informed by risk modelling should integrate all of 
these aspects of resilience, linking, for example, financial 
mechanisms with risk-reduction efforts. It should also 
relate adaptation to development initiatives. For example, 
linking disaster-risk finance and insurance instruments 
to the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and 
national adaptation plans (NAPs) could identify how to best 
capture resilience dividends. For this to happen we need 
joined-up policy-making between treasury, environment and 
disaster-management divisions within government. These 
divisions must also work collaboratively with development 
agencies to put climate risk data at the heart of national 
adaptation strategies. Such joined-up policy-making will 
support essential innovations, such as the bancassurance 
model (see Section 7.2), in which development banks 
promote the development and application of risk informa-
tion, risk reduction and preparedness measures, thereby 
enabling insurers to price the risks, and supplement the 
financing of post-disaster recovery and reconstruction with 
their capital. 
Develop consistent climate adaptation regulation and 
standards across countries. In order to implement effec-
tive national and cross-border use of risk financing and 
insurance instruments for climate adaptation, common 
standards and a consistent regulatory framework are 
needed. This will require supra-national actors, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), to establish standards 
that anchor ‘climate and disaster risk finance and insur-
ance’ (CDRFI) into macro-fiscal considerations. An interna-
tional standard for risk finance in macro-fiscal frameworks 
would be an effective way to trigger action at governmental 
level. Governments need to take a proactive approach to 
climate-change-driven risk in their budgetary and fiscal 
cycles. The inclusion of national climate-risk management 
measures that comply with agreed supra-national report-
ing standards could help foster this proactive approach. In 
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addition, a systematic supra-national approach to the reg-
ulation of insurance markets, to which individual countries 
adhere, will be necessary. Appropriate regulation ensures 
that climate-related insurance is safe for the consumer, in 
terms of ensuring both appropriate conduct by insurers, 
and that they will be able to pay claims and won’t all file for 
insolvency after a large disaster. Consistency across coun-
tries is important as sound climate-risk insurance typically 
requires an appropriate balance between retaining risks 
in-country, and transferring to globally diversified interna-
tional markets.
Foster insurance innovations that can respond to a 
changing climate risk landscape. Insurance innovations 
need to incorporate a dynamic, long-term, and adaptive 
view of risk into modelling and pricing. Digitalization, 
including big data and machine-learning algorithms, has 
the potential to substantially increase the impact of risk 
finance and insurance on resilience. Applications should 
include the improvement of risk analytics and modelling, 
more accurate forecasting capabilities to promote early 
action, development of more sophisticated triggers for 
more effective and reliable parametric insurance cover-
age, and speeding up claims’ settlement and payouts. 
Development agencies, intergovernmental organizations, 
and donors, can support the development of these inno-
vations for the benefit of adaptation. In addition, in order 
to overcome challenges around affordability and access, it 
will be necessary to create risk-sharing partnerships, and 
incentives to attract private sector investment into coun-
tries in need. 
Strengthen dialogue between insurers and policy-makers 
around Build Back Better. The construction of new public 
and private assets should consider long-term trends in 
climate risks, and lower greenhouse gas emissions related 
to the construction and operation of these assets. Climate 
adaptation policy should therefore drive new building codes 
that are focused improved resilience and sustainability 
criteria, and which are mandatory for reconstruction efforts 
after disasters. Insurance innovations should then focus 
on incorporating this Build Back Better approach into the 
pricing of indemnity products, potentially going beyond the 
value of the damaged assets. 
Converge insurance, humanitarian and development 
agendas. Developmental and humanitarian efforts must 
be connected effectively to financial systems, integrating 
all lines of defense around the risk-management cycle. 
Public–private partnerships are needed to ensure that the 
risk capital and expertise of the insurance industry are 
made available in products designed appropriately and 
channeled towards the poorest, the most vulnerable, and 
the marginalized. Collaboration and stakeholder engage-
ment will be essential: insurance needs to further research 
and possibly rediscover the needs of these parts of the 
population, while governments and development organiza-
tions must promote business opportunities for insurance 
to invest in ‘bottom of the pyramid’ markets. In addition, 
subsidization of insurance for the most vulnerable must be 
considered, in order to include them in the greater socio-
economic stability that insurance provides.
Promote and invest in risk literacy throughout society. 
Investment to build capacity in risk literacy is not simply 
about making people (in all parts of society) better able to 
use insurance mechanisms and tools. Rather, we empha-
size that risk literacy, and thereafter insurance, support: (i) 
the provision of essential information for decision making; 
(ii) mechanisms through which public policy processes, 
policy-makers, and insureds can objectively engage around 
considerations of risk; and (iii) prudent and effective deci-
sions by policy-makers, and the establishment of neces-
sary systems and rules to manage risks actively in the 
short, medium and longer term. By investing in widespread 
risk literacy, we make possible the range of other recom-
mendations made above.
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Appendix: Contingency planning
African Risk Capacity (ARC). 
Contingency plans: targeting the most 
vulnerable
To ensure that countries are able to deploy ARC payouts 
quickly and efficiently, the ARC has adopted, as part of its 
governance and operations, specific criteria and standards 
that countries must meet before they can enter into an 
insurance contract with ARC Ltd. These criteria also serve 
to ensure that insurance payouts are proactively linked to 
responses focused on the most vulnerable households and 
communities. 
Countries considering securing insurance coverage from 
the ARC Insurance Company Limited (ARC Ltd) must 
have a Certificate of Good Standing (CGS) granted by 
the ARC Board in accordance with criteria adopted by its 
Conference of Parties (CoP).ii  One of the CGS Criteria is 
that a country must have a Contingency Plan approved by 
the ARC Board.iii  The ARC Contingency Plan is comprised 
of two parts:
1. An Operations Plan which includes information regard-
ing the specific country’s natural disaster risk profile, 
risk-transfer parameters, planned interventions, and 
draft implementation plans for each possible activity 
proposed for use of a potential payout. 
2. A Final Implementation Plan (FIP) details information 
on how an ARC Ltd payout will be deployed after a spe-
cific natural disaster event. 
The purpose of an Operations Plan is to delineate the 
use of an ARC Ltd payout in advance so that if a country 
receives such a payout it will be prepared to use the funds 
immediately and effectively.58  Operations Plans take into 
account existing national systems and are evaluated based 
on two standards:
1. Do the proposed activities meet ARC’s Basic Eligibility 
Criteria?
2. Can the proposed activities be adequately imple-
mented, monitored and evaluated (collectively, the 
Implementation Criteria)?
Basic Eligibility Criteria
Three questions are actively considered in determining if 
an activity proposed in a country’s Operations Plan meets 
ARC’s Basic Eligibility Criteria.
1. TIME SENSITIVE AND/OR CATALYTIC:
a) Time-sensitive activities are those that:
i) Are made possible through the provision of timely 
and reliable funds, and
ii) Are implemented within approximately 120 days of 
when an ARC Ltd payout is received.
b) Catalytic activities are those that prompt or enable other 
activities that ensure faster, more predictable and more 
effective action for the overall response.
2. CRITICAL SERVICES AND IMPACTS: 
a) ARC Ltd payouts should not be used for general 
investment. 
b) Activities must aim to support and catalyze critical 
activities post-disaster. In slow-onset events, this means 
protecting livelihoods of beneficiaries that would be 
negatively impacted if they have to wait to receive assis-
tance or face a gap or inconsistency in their assistance. 
In rapid-onset events, this may include supporting the 
basic needs of those affected, and/or protecting liveli-
hoods of beneficiaries. 
c) The interventions offer the best use of funds within a 
specific timeframe, addressing the best available under-
standing of needs.
3. ABLE TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN SIX 
MONTHS: 
a) Activities that will be funded by an ARC Ltd payout 
should be completed within six months in order to 
ensure that financial resources are utilized in a timely 
and efficient manner, capitalizing on the “fast, reliable 
funds” principle of ARC.
Each activity proposed in the Operations Plan must meet 
all three eligibility criteria.
ii   See the Establishment Agreement of the African Risk Capacity (ARC) Agency, Article 13 paragraph 2 (h & l); and the Report and Decisions of the Second 
Conference of the Parties of the African Risk Capacity (ARC) Agency, paragraph 9(d).
iii  See the Establishment Agreement, Article 15 (k & l).
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Implementation Criteria
Once an activity meets the Basic Eligibility Criteria, it is also 
reviewed to determine whether the activity can be imple-
mented, monitored and evaluated. Activities may be imple-
mented, monitored and evaluated through external partner 
entities that the country has utilized for past operations. 
Detailed information on any implementing partners must 
be provided as part of the Plans. 
In all cases, countries are encouraged to seek to scale up 
existing activities, where possible, in order to guarantee the 
most efficient use of ARC funds. All partners will ideally be 
existing partners who have worked jointly to implement 
programs with the country in the past and, therefore, have 
been appropriately vetted as part of these prior activities. 
In the case of a rapid onset disaster response, if partners 
are likely to be different to those used in normal program-
ming, countries are required to submit pre-signed MOUs 
with relevant agencies for relief, covering specific program 
activities.
Each country must provide information on each pro-
posed activity to outline how the activity will meet the 
Implementation Criteria – including budgets, timelines and 
information on all entities involved – across five different 
areas:
1. Operations – Countries are required to provide a 
detailed summary of the activity being proposed and all 
of the steps that must be carried out to complete the 
activity, including expedited procurement processes,  
if any.
2. Administration and Flow of Funds – Countries are 
required to outline how the government will manage an 
ARC Ltd payout internally and how it will reach benefi-
ciaries as assistance, including in the case of a rapid-on-
set, accelerated payout scenario. 
3. Needs Assessment – Countries will need to provide 
information on existing needs assessment approaches, 
any changes that would be necessary in the event of an 
ARC Ltd payout and details on alternative approaches 
being considered if appropriate.
4. Targeting – Countries are required to provide informa-
tion on how they will carry out targeting of beneficiaries, 
the expected profile of beneficiaries and categories of 
beneficiaries, what type of targeting mechanisms and 
criteria will be used to identify the different categories of 
beneficiaries, and how they will ensure that the appro-
priate assistance reaches the intended beneficiaries in 
a transparent manner with attention to gender equality 
and social inclusion. 
5. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) System – Each pro-
posed activity requires a monitoring and evaluation sys-
tem that properly assesses the outputs of the program, 
based on the objectives of ARC and ARC reporting 
requirements. The M&E system should be based, where 
possible, on the existing M&E system of the proposed 
intervention. Full information on the M&E system must 
be provided. 
Countries are also required to submit documentation to 
support the information provided, including regarding the 
feasibility and adequacy of the systems proposed to carry 
out the functions described in the plan, and the national 
(including partner) implementation capacity to execute the 
plan efficiently. 
As much as possible, the systems proposed across all five 
areas should build on existing and tested activities and pro-
cesses, and work with identified partners that the country 
has worked with in the past. All proposed procurement, 
needs assessment, targeting and M&E systems must be 
sufficiently robust to ensure transparency and accountabili-
ty in the use of funds associated with ARC. 
Review process 
When an Operations Plan is finalized through in-country 
processes, the country submits it to the Secretariat, which 
in turn submits it to the Technical Review Committee (TRC) 
comprised of seven independent experts. The TRC reviews 
and evaluates the Operations Plan, and provides a report 
of its assessment (the TRC Report) to the Peer Review 
Mechanism (PRM) of the Board. 
The PRM, which includes three members of the Board, 
conducts its own independent evaluation of the Operations 
Plan, taking into consideration the TRC Report. The PRM 
then issues a report to the full Board (the PRM Report) with 
its recommendations regarding whether the Operations 
Plan has met the criteria set by the Board. 
The Board takes the final decision regarding whether an 
Operations Plan has met the CP Standards.
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Glossary
ARC (African Risk Capacity) was established in 2012 as a Specialized Agency of the African Union (AU), with 18 Member 
States that signed the Establishment Agreement initially, which has grown to 33 Member States by the end of 2018. ARC 
aims to provide insurance products that help protect from the impacts of extreme weather events, such as drought. 
CCR (Caisse Centrale de Reassurance) is a public-sector reinsurer established in 1946 which provides insurers operating in 
France with multi-peril coverage against natural catastrophes and other risks.
CCRIF SPC (Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility) is an entity established in 2007 that provides insurance cov-
er for hurricane, earthquake and excess rainfall to its, as in 2018, 18 Caribbean government-members and one Central 
American government member.
CCS (Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros - Insurance Compensation Consortium) is a state-owned entity established 
in 1941 that provides insurance cover for natural and terrorism disasters in Spain. 
Disaster liquidity is the short-term liquidity necessary in the aftermath of disasters to support response and start recovery 
efforts while maintaining essential government service.
Exposure refers to the inventory of elements such as citizens, infrastructure, housing, production capacities and other tangi-
ble human and natural assets in an area in which hazard events may occur. Measures of exposure can include the number 
of citizens or types of assets in an area. 
FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) is an agency of the United States Department of Homeland Security 
with the purpose to coordinate the response to a disaster that has occurred in the United States and that overwhelms the 
resources of local and state authorities.
Financial protection is the financial resilience of governments, private sector and citizens through insurance-based 
mechanisms.
FONDEN (Fondo de Desastres Naturales - Natural Disasters Fund) is a public entity established in 1996 that provides insur-
ance cover to the Mexican States and the Federal Agencies against natural disasters. 
Hazard is the condition that can cause a disaster such as a hurricane or a tsunami.
Indemnity insurance is a contractual agreement in which the insurer guarantees compensation for actual losses or damag-
es sustained by the insured. 
Modelled loss is the loss estimate determined by a modelled representation of a catastrophe event that represents the 
underlying insurance risk. The event parameters are fed into a catastrophe model to calculate the modelled loss.
NFIP (National Flood Insurance Program) is a program created by the Congress of the United States in 1968 through the 
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 that aims to reduce the impact of flooding on private and public structures by provid-
ing affordable insurance to property owners, renters and businesses and by encouraging communities to adopt and enforce 
floodplain management regulations.
Parametric insurance is a type of insurance that uses a parameter or an index of parameters of the catastrophic event as 
triggers for issuing a payout. Such insurance products may combine a mix of triggers from indemnity to industry loss, to the 
occurrence of specific parameters of a peril, such as wind speeds within a specified zone. Such products can also be linked 
to modelled losses (as opposed to actual claims for losses), triggering a payment when losses exceed a particular thresh-
old. However, they do not have to be linked specifically to modelled claims for property loss.
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Peril is the direct cause of loss such as flood or earthquake.
Risk is the possibility of loss. (More elaborate definition needed)
Risk Financing is the financial protection of populations against disaster events to increase the ability of national and local 
governments, homeowners, businesses, agricultural producers, and low-income populations to respond to disasters. 
Protection gap is the gap between the insured and actual economic losses caused by large-scale catastrophic events. It 
refers to a global problem, affecting all countries, and referring to the whole uninsured and underinsured population includ-
ing citizens, companies and governments.
Protection Gap Entity (PGE) is the entity that brings together different market and non-market stakeholders in an effort to 
address the protection gap by transforming uninsured risk into insurance-based products that can be transferred onto gov-
ernment balance sheets or into global financial markets in order to provide capital for recovery following a disaster. 
Preparedness is the development of early warning systems, support of emergency measures and contingency planning to 
prepare ex-ante for disasters.
Risk mitigation refers to taking action to reduce the adverse effects of disasters. 
Risk identification is about identifying, assessing and analyzing risk, typically as a technical capability supporting the quan-
tification and communications of risk assessments and risk communication.
Resilient reconstruction is the ex-post reconstruction of property and the built environment for quicker, more resilient 
disaster recovery. (actually, these two elements are usually in competition - it is hard to build back better more quickly than 
building back the way it was before - so it is almost always a trade-off which should be recognized in this definition)
Risk reduction is the reduction of risks in society by implementing structural and non-structural measures in policy and 
investment. 
Vulnerability refers to the propensity of exposed elements such as individuals, a community, and assets to suffer adverse 
effects of hazard events.
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